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THE PUZZLE OF THE DIGNITARY TORTS
Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward Whitet

In recent years, there has been much greater legal attention paid to aspects of dignity that have previously been ignored or treated with actual hostility, especially in
constitutional law and public law generally. But private law
also plays an important role. In particular,certainforms of
tort liability are imposed in order to protect individual dignity
of various sorts and compensate for invasions of individual
dignity. Defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and even false imprisonmentfall into
this category. Despite the growing importance of dignity, this
value has received very little self-conscious or express attention in tort cases or torts scholarship. The absence of a robustly-articulatedconception of the interest in dignity that tort
law protects is puzzling. Why have notions of dignity and
dignitary torts been little more than labels, reflecting a value
that has gone unanalyzed and undebated, despite its obvious
and growing importance? The answers to these questions lie
in the structure of the common law of torts, the history of
twentieth-century tort law scholarship, the jurisprudence of
doctrinal boundaries, and-perhaps, surprisingly-developments in constitutionallaw during the lastfour decades of the
twentieth century. In the first analysis of the dignitary torts as
a whole in half a century, this Article explores the puzzle of the
dignitary torts. It argues that these torts have been undertheorized because of the very nature of the common law system, which poses a powerful obstacle to any doctrinal reorientationof tort law toward the understandingor creationof
a unified species of dignitary torts. The law of torts may be
fully capable of protecting the forms of dignity that our world
increasingly recognizes and honors, but it turns out that it
must do so in the same manner that it has always protected
the interests that are centralto our values-cause-of-actionby
cause-of-action.
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INTRODUCTION

During much of the history of the United States, the notion
that every individual is entitled to the requisites of human dignity has been honored more in the abstract than in legal action.
Over time, there has been progress toward according all people
legal rights to the dignity they deserve, but there can be no
dispute that the steps we have taken toward that ideal have
been incomplete and imperfect. Nonetheless, much greater legal attention has been paid in recent years to aspects of dignity
that previously have been ignored or treated with actual hostility. We need look no further than the recognition of same-sex
marriage and the enhanced rights of LGBT individuals to see
that the overall trajectory of legal protections for individual
dignity is trending upward.' This upward trajectory extends to
of the dignitary inother settings as well, including protection
2 and the disabled, 3 among others. 4
elderly
the
of
terests
Legal protection of individual dignity, however, is not only
the province of constitutional law or public law more generally.
Private law also plays an important role. In particular, tort law
provides a good deal of protection for individual dignity. Tort
liability is imposed not only to protect against and compensate
for bodily injury, damage to property, emotional distress, and
economic loss, but also to protect individual dignity of various
sorts and compensate for invasions of individual dignity. Despite the growing importance of dignity, this value has received
very little self-conscious or express attention in tort cases or
torts scholarship. Although there are frequent, passing references to the "dignitary torts," these references are often made
1

See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).

2

See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623

(2018).
3 See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2018).
4 For example, there have been periodic proposals for conceptualizing such
disparate problems as fraud and liability for tainted food as involving human
dignity. See, e.g., Roger Brownsword, An Interest in Human Dignity as the Basis
for Genomic Torts, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 427 (2003) (discussing the support that
human dignity would offer genetic torts if human dignity became a protectable
tort interest); L. Camille Hdbert, Conceptualizing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace as a Dignitary Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1345, 1349 (2014) (proposing that
sexual harassment be conceptualized as a dignitary tort); Andrew L. Merritt,
Damagesfor Emotional Distress in FraudLitigation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1989) (encouraging courts to recognize
fraud as a dignitary tort that justifies the award of emotional distress damages);
Melissa Mortazavi, Tainted: Food, Identity, and the Searchfor Dignitary Redress,
81 BROOK. L. REv. 1463, 1486 (2016) (arguing that dignitary torts may provide the
best redress for individuals against offensive food taint). However, none of those
sources contain a sustained analysis of the concept of dignity.
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without further explanation. 5 The term "dignity," as it is used
in passages referring to an unspecified set of torts, appears to
us to be a placeholder for an inchoate but unarticulated idea. 6
This is the notion that some tort actions are available when a
person has been offended, embarrassed, ridiculed, or misportrayed by the words or actions of another in a way that does not
respect that person's intrinsic worth. There has been virtually
no analysis, however, of the nature or scope of this interest in
dignity or the ways that the often-unnamed dignitary torts protect this interest.
The absence of a robustly articulated conception of the
interest in dignity that tort law protects poses a puzzle. If dignity is one of the handful of important interests that figure in
the imposition of tort liability, why has there been so little
analysis of the constitutive elements of that interest? Why
have the notions of dignity and dignitary torts been little more
than labels, reflecting a value that has gone unanalyzed and
undebated, despite its obvious and growing importance?
The answers to these questions lie in the structure of the
common law of torts, the history of twentieth-century tort law
scholarship, the jurisprudence of doctrinal boundaries, andperhaps surprisingly-developments in constitutional law dur5 We surveyed articles and comments using the terms "dignity," "dignitary,"
and "dignitary torts" between 1986 and 2017. The survey produced thirty-five
articles in which the terms "dignity" and "dignitary" were applied to tort law. Most
of the articles argued that particular actions, such as interference with the "right
to die," redress for the commercial dissemination of personal information, fraud,
sexual harassment in the workplace, violations of informed consent in medical
malpractice cases, intrusive genetic testing, and redress for the supplying of food
to prisoners who objected to its content on religious grounds amounted to dignitary torts.
Of those articles, only three made a sustained effort to analyze what interests
might be protected in the concept of dignity: Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity
Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation of
Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213 (1999); Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundationsof Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L.
REv. 957 (1989); Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Tortsfrom the Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REv. 65 (2012). The bulk of the articles simply took for
granted that there was a category of "dignitary" torts that sought to redress
"emotional," rather than physical or economic harm and then argued that
various
tort actions should emphasize the "dignitary harm" plaintiffs had suffered.
6
In DAN B. DOBBS & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED
TORTS: ECONONC AND DIGNITARY TORTS 1-3 (2006), to take a prominent example,

there Is an introduction entitled "What are Economic and Dignitary Torts?" The
closest the authors come to explaining what interests "dignitary torts" might
protect is one sentence in which they describe a "dignitary loss" as "a damage to
one's rights of personality." Id. at 1. We refer to such unanalyzed references to
dignity as "placeholders," because we suspect that those making the references
have a sense of what "dignity" might entail but are disinclined to articulate it more
precisely.
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ing the last four decades of the twentieth century. These answers reveal insights about the nature of the dignitary interests
that tort law protects and the continuing influence of the ancient common law "forms of action" on modem legal development. The great historian of the common law, Frederic William
Maitland, famously said that although we have buried the
7
forms of action, "they still rule us from their graves." More
than a century after Maitland wrote, this is still strikingly true
as far as the dignitary torts are concerned. In addition, new
torts have followed the model of the ancient approach. When
common law forms of action protecting important aspects of
dignity have not had modern counterparts, the law of torts has
found it necessary to invent what amounts to new forms of
action. 8 Moreover, we contend it could not be otherwise.
This Article seeks to explain the puzzle of the dignitary
torts. Part I provides a philosophical and historical overview of
the concept of dignity. The meaning of dignity has changed a
good deal over the centuries, and it was only in the twentieth
century that our current thinking about dignity fully crystalized. We suggest that the modem concept of dignity involves
respecting the worth of each individual. There is a gulf, however, between the majesty of that concept and its translation
into concrete legal rights. As a prelude to our analysis of the
role that the concept of dignity has played in U.S. tort law, we
then briefly document the way that European law has handled
this difficulty through the development of a right of "personality" protected by tort law.
Part II then identifies and describes the American common
law torts that fall generally within the "dignitary" category and
uncovers a period in the history of American tort law when
prominent scholars recognized the potential for a somewhat
unified cause of action protecting dignitary and emotional interests. In our view, this episode was part of a broader inclination on the part of torts scholars during that period to distance
tort law from the restrictions of the common law forms of action
and the modern doctrinal categories that were their successors. But the effort to shake off the bounds of common law
formalism and take advantage of the potential for "unification"

7 F. W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 2 (A.H. Chaytor &W.J.
Whittaker eds., 1st ed. 1909).
8 Examples include invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. For further discussion, see infra notes 101-23 and accompanying
text.
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did not result in the creation of anything like a generic set of
"dignitary torts."
Far from embracing the idea that several torts allowing
redress for non-physical harm share a unitary concern with
protecting dignity or emotional interests, neither tort liability
nor tort theory ever developed very far in that direction. It
turned out that the concept of dignity was not sufficiently specific to ground the very different protections that would be
encompassed within a unified cause of action for invasion of
dignity. This is because, as we show, the interests protected by
the torts that can be considered "dignitary"-offensive battery,
false imprisonment, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy-are very different from
each other and reflect very different dimensions of individual
dignity.
Part III continues this examination by identifying a second
major reason for unification's failure to develop. Toward the
end of the period in question, the U.S. Supreme Court began,
for the first time, to impose First Amendment restrictions on
the scope of liability for the very torts that had only recently
been recognized as protecting dignitary interests. This unprecedented constitutional intervention into state tort law truncated further development of these torts and directed scholarly
focus away from the possibility of unification and toward the
constitutional dimensions of the torts, occupying a considerable quotient of scholarly attention over a period of decades.
Finally, Part IV explains why a unified conception of the
dignitary torts was never really a possibility. It is fashionable
these days for historians to identify contingencies in the development of the law, suggesting that often things might have
developed otherwise. 9 In the area of the dignitary torts, in contrast, we think that the condition in which the law finds itself
lies nearer to the "inevitability" than to the "contingency" side
of the spectrum of explanation. Doctrinal development in
American tort law is not simply a function of changing attitudes towards the interests potentially being protected in tort
suits. If that were the case, there are cultural reasons why a
series of torts now grouped under disparate doctrinal categories might have readily been understood as essentially concerned with the protection of individual dignity. But the forms
of action historically associated with the common law of torts
separately specified the distinctive elements of each form of
9

Two notable examples are JOHN FABIAN WITr, Tim ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 21

(2004), and RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 13-15 (2007).
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action and thereby determined the structure of tort liability,
even after abolition of the forms. The resulting substantive and
structural separation of the dignitary torts from each other
rendered unification an impossibility.
We conclude that the current doctrinal boundaries within
the dignitary torts are not merely a product of a contingentpath dependency, but something that is inevitably endemic to a
common law system and amounts to a powerful obstacle to any
doctrinal reorientation of tort law toward the creation of a unified species of dignitary torts. The law of torts may be fully
capable of protecting the forms of dignity that our world increasingly recognizes and honors, but it turns out that it must
do so in the same manner that it has always protected the
interests that are central to our values-cause-of-action by
cause-of-action.
I
THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY

Two strains of the concept of dignity can be discerned in
the period when the common law of torts was developing. The
first involved rank; the second involved the worth of the individual. Even the latter conception, however, has never been
sufficiently concrete to serve alone as the foundation for private
rights.
A.

Dignity as Rank or Station

The original conception centered on the dignity associated
with social status. 1 0 When the English common law began to
develop after the Norman conquest there was no writ available
10 Early legal regimes reflected some limited concern with dignity. In Greece
and Rome, there was a concept of what came to be called in Roman law "iniurial"
liability, liability for insult or outrage. The concept encompassed actions that
would now be termed batteries, resulting in physical injury, but also included
nonphysical harms. In the Corpus Juris Civilis, codified by the Emperor Justinian between 529 and 534 A.D., "iniuria" was associated not only with "striking
with the fist, a stick, or a whip" but with "vituperation for the purpose of collecting
a crowd," "taking possession of a man's effects on the ground that he was in one's
debt," "writing, composing, or publishing defamatory prose or verse," "constantly
following a matron, or a young boy or girl below the age of puberty," and "attempting anybody's chastity." Francis L. Coolidge, Jr., Iniuriain the Corpus Juris Civilis,
50 B.U. L. REv. 271, 271-72 (1970); see also ANDREW BORKOWSKI, TEXTBOOK ON
ROMAN LAw 303 (1994) (describing the early Roman system of formalized personal
revenge for wrongs committed against an Individual). For more details on ancient
Greek law, see generally MICHAEL GARGIN, EARLY GREEK LAw (1986) and Russ VER-

STEEG, LAW NTHE ANCIENT WORLD §§ 7.01-9.08 (2002). See also M. Stuart Madden,
The Greco-Roman Antecedents of Modern Tort Law, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 865, 868-87
(2006) (tracing the law of early Greece and Rome from their respective origins in
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to redress infringement of dignity. I" This should not suggest,
however, that there was no recognized concept of dignity in
English culture at the time. In fact, the concept of dignity was
pervasive because it was associated with social rank and status
in a society in which those phenomena were widely regarded as
the most relevant indicators of a person's place in his or her
world. 12 Status rituals, such as lower-status members of the
population doffing their hats, curtseying, or touching their
forelocks when high-status members encountered them in
public, and the high-status members' acknowledging that
treatment with attenuated bows, were a ubiquitous feature of
social interchange. 13
Such rituals reflected the "dignity" of station, or, on occasion, the dignity of office. Kings, nobles, "gentlemen," and "ladies" were treated as if their social rank itself was deserving of
respect. 14 With the possession of a certain social rank came a
certain "dignity," meaning that the status itself was expected to
trigger some public acknowledgment, in the form of one or
another ritual of obeisance, of the superiority of the individual
holding it. 15Accompanying the gestures of obeisance were gesmyth and legend through their initial written legal recordations and their later
comprehensive codifications).

11

See generally R.C.

VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRIS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CON-

QUEST TO GLANVILL 177-90 (1959).
12

See JEREMY

WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS

30-33 (2012).

13 See Penelope Jane Corfield, From Hat Honour to the Handshake: Changing
Styles of Communication in the Eighteenth Century, in HATS OFF, GENTLEMEN!
CHANGING ARTS OF COMMUNICATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 7 (P.J. Corfield & L.
Hannan eds., 2017).
14
See WALDRON, supranote 12, at 30-33.
15 For example, in his writings, the nineteenth-century English essayist
Thomas de Quincey repeated a story told to him by another essayist, William
Hazlitt, about a walk taken by Ernest Augustus, the second Duke of Cumberland
(and the fifth son of George III), in London. The story captures the two ways in
which dignity as rank was understood in early nineteenth century England by
showing the subtly different ways in which the Duke acknowledged, and was
acknowledged by, individuals he encountered on his walk. The Duke's walk began at St. James palace, where he was staying, and proceeded onto the street of
Pall-Mall, a busy main thoroughfare:
On this occasion all the men who met the prince took off their
hats, the prince acknowledging every such obeisance by a separate
bow. Pall-Mall being finished, and its whole host of royal salutations gathered in, next the Duke came to Cockspur Street. But
here, and taking a station close to the crossing, which daily he
beautified and polished with his broom, stood a negro sweep.
The Duke drew out his purse and tossed a coin, possibly a half a
crown, to the sweep, while at the same time keeping "his hat rigidly
settled on his head" and making no bow. It would have seemed
undignified, in one sense, for Ernest to ignore the sweep altogether,
especially since the sweep was "beautify[ing] and polish[ing] with his
broom" the area where Pall-Mall intersected with Cockspur Street,
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tures of acknowledgment from the higher-status persons, such
as the discreet bows that confirmed their recognition of the
gestures, and their recognition not only of the status differences that had prompted them but of the persons who had
doffed their caps or touched their forelocks. 16 The gestures of
acknowledgment were designed to convey another version of
"dignity," the civility with which high-status persons were expected to greet others of lower status. 17
B.

Dignity as Individual Worth

An alternative conception of dignity, as being associated
with the sentient capacities of humans, was at first linked to
man's being made in the image of God and thus being capable
of appreciating God in a manner that non-human species could
not. 18 By the late eighteenth century this capacity of humans
to reason and exercise free will had been secularized, most
notably in the writings of Immanuel Kant. 19 Kant did not often
expressly refer to dignity, and there is some debate about
whether the German term he employed (wurde, roughly
equivalent to "worth") should be understood as the equivalent
of dignity. 20 Most scholarship on Kant associates him with two
claims about dignity: that human worth should be understood
in itself and not simply as a means to glorify God, and that
human worth is centered in autonomy-the capacity of people
to choose and reason for themselves. 2 1 This conception of dignity is centered on the intrinsic qualities of human individuals
rather than in rank or status.
Coexisting with Kant's treatment, in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, were writings that associated
dignity with various efforts at social leveling: republicanism in
France and America emphasized the extension of privileges
previously accorded only to aristocrats to all citizens and the
22
connection between dignity and the natural rights of man,
and Ernest was to cross. Yet at the same time it seemed undignified
for Ernest, a member of royalty, to go so far as to condescend to a
black sweep with a measured bow.
THOMAS DE QUINCEY, THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS DE QUINCEY, 348-49

(David Masson ed., 1890).
16
See id.
17
See id.
18

MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING

19
20

See I. at 19.

16-18 (2012).

See id. at 19-21.
See id.at 30-31.
See Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and JudicialInterpretationof
Human Rights, 19 EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 655, 660 (2008) (discussing the use of
21
22
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while anti-slavery literature of the mid-nineteenth century as23
serted that slavery was incompatible with human dignity.
Some European philosophers, however, did challenge Kant's
concept of dignity itself. In 1837, Arthur Schopenhauer declared Kant's version of "human dignity" to "lack ... any basis
at all which was possessed of an intelligible meaning." 2 4 In
1847, Karl Marx called appeals to human dignity "a refuge from
history in morality."25 And in 1872, Friedrich Nietzsche declared that "the 'dignity of man'" and "the 'dignity of labour'"
were illusory phrases, since "every human being," with his total
activity, "only has dignity in so far as he is a tool of the genius,
26
consciously or unconsciously."
Nonetheless, the conception of dignity as reflecting the
worth of all individuals, rather than merely being an offshoot of
social rank, gained momentum in the twentieth century. Between 1917 and 1940, provisions referring to the "dignity of
man," and prohibiting violations of that dignity, appeared in
the constitutions of Mexico, Germany under the Weimar Republic, Finland, Portugal, Ireland, and Cuba. 2 7 Although these
countries followed different ideologies-republicanism, socialism, and humanistic versions of Catholicism-each of their
constitutions incorporated concerns regarding individual dignity.2 8 "Dignity" was associated with natural rights, which included a right to something like "decent treatment," with
access to basic human needs, such as food, clothing, and shelter; it was a right to be treated equally and with a religiousbased obligation to care for less fortunate members of
society.

29

Then, in the wake of World War II, dignity became even
more firmly associated with intrinsic human rights. Three na"dignity" in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man in France, in Thomas
Paine's 1791 pamphlet, The Rights of Man, and in Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Man (1790) and Vindication of the Rights of Women (1796)).
23 The most prominent example was the April 27, 1848 decree abolishing
slavery in France, which described slavery as "an assault upon human dignity"
and thus "a flagrant violation of the republican creed." For more detail, see
generally Rebecca J. Scott, Dignit6/Dignidade:OrganizingAgainst Threats to Dignity in Societies After Slavery, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 61-77 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013).
24 See McCrudden, supranote 22, at 661.
25 Id
26 Id. at 661-62.
27 See id. at 664.
28 See id.
29 See, e.g., id. at 694 (quoting an opinion from the Constitutional Court of
South Africa in which the judge compared the concept of dignity to various socioeconomic rights).
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tions on the losing side of the war adopted postwar constitutions declaring dignity to be a fundamental human right:
Japan in 1946, Italy in 1948, and West Germany in 1949.30 By
incorporating dignity into their constitutions, those nations
signaled that they were repudiating the horrifying practices
engaged in by the totalitarian regimes that had preceded them,
such as the persecution of ethnic minorities, torture, mass
exterminations, the brutal treatment of prisoners of war, and
the utter neglect of the health and well-being of some members
of their populations. In those nations' postwar constitutions,
"dignity" was primarily associated with access to the basic
needs of human existence and the protection of the individual
from being subjected to degrading or humiliating practices. 3 1
In the same period, what came to be called international
declarations of human rights gained significant attention. In
connection with the creation of the United Nations, a body
designed in part to prevent worldwide conflicts and to identify
and sanction human rights violations, several groups and nations drafted proposed declarations, sometimes as suggestions
for the United Nations charter. 3 2 They included the American
Jewish Committee, Uruguay, Cuba, the American Federation of
Labor, and, in 1947, both the United States and the United
Kingdom. 3 3 A common feature of those declarations were stipulations, either in their prefaces or in the form of articles positioned early in the documents, of the value of "human dignity"
or the "dignity of the individual human being."3 4
Sometimes the documents associated "dignity" with equality, sometimes with freedom, and sometimes with protection
from "indignity."3 5 Thus, the American Jewish Committee referred to "the dignity and inviolability of the person, of his
sacred right to live and to develop,"3 6 the American Federation
of Labor to the right of every human being to "pursue his or her
work . . . in conditions of freedom and dignity,"3 7 and the
United States government to the freedom of "any person" from
being subjected to "torture, or to cruel or inhuman punishment, or to cruel or inhuman indignity."38
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

See id. at 664.
See icL at 666.
See i. at 665-66.
See id
See id at 666.
See id
Id at 665.
Id. at 666.

38

Id.
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Those various strands came together in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, promulgated in 1948 after the crea-9
3
tion of the United Nations with its accompanying charter.
The preamble to the Universal Declaration referred to the "infamily" and the
herent dignity... of all members of the human
40
"dignity and worth of the human person."
The fullest understanding of what was meant by "dignity,"
in its principal post-World War II formulation, came in the
1949 Geneva Convention, which summarized rules for the
treatment of prisoners of war, and subsequent Protocols in
1977. 4 1 The wartime treatment of prisoners and enemies readily summoned up associations of the concept of dignity with the
protection of captured, injured, or dead soldiers from torture,
neglect, or having their bodies defiled. The preamble to the
1949 Geneva Convention, after declaring that "[rlespect for the
personality and dignity of human beings constitutes a universal principle which is binding [on nations and individuals] even
in the absence of any contractual undertaking" stated that "in
time of war . . . all those placed 'hors de combat' by reason of
sickness, wounds, capture, or any other circumstance, shall be
given due respect and have protection from the effects of war,
and that those among them who are in suffering shall be suc42
cored and tended."
Article 3 of the 1949 Convention prohibited "outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment."43 And the first and second 1977 Protocols particularized that prohibition, singling out "enforced prostitution," "any
form of indecent assault," "rape," and enforced "racial discrimi44
nation," such as "apartheid."
Since the 1970s, the incorporation of the concept of dignity
45
into multiple human rights charters has become ubiquitous.
Such charters routinely refer to the "inherent dignity and
worth" of humans, and prospective violations of dignity have
been associated not only with torture and other "outrages" of
39
40

See id.

41

See id.

42

Id.
Id. at 668.
Id.
See id.

Id. at 667. Article I spoke of"[alil human beings" being "born free and equal
in dignity" and "endowed with reason and conscience." Article 22 stated that
"[elveryone, as a member of society," was "entitled to realization ... of the economic, social, and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity." Article 23 noted
that "[elveryone who works has the right to just and favorable remuneration
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity." Id.
43

44
45
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the sort proscribed by the Geneva Convention and its protocols, but also with the treatment of children, migrant workers,
indigenous peoples, disabled persons, and persons in extreme
poverty or lacking in basic food supplies. 4 6 Violations of dignity
have also been linked, in international human rights documents, with the conditions under which criminal suspects are
detained, educational practices, welfare programs, medical
practices, biomedical experiments, and the control of and ac47
cess to personal data.
In short, worldwide reaction to the horrors of World War II
served to elevate the idea of dignity to a universal condition of
all humans unaffected by rank or status. In the attempted
reconstitution of the "civilized" world order that was undertaken after the war's end, dignity migrated from being a concept only partially associated with inherent and universal
human capacities to one primarily associated with those capacities. The dignity of humans gave them "rights," which
modern states and their fellow citizens needed to respect.
C.

The Core Meaning of Dignity

Metamorphosis of the concept, however, did not produce
much clarity as to what "dignity," as a social and legal concept,
consists. It might seem that once the concept of dignity migrated from its original association with social rank to an association with inherent human capacities, the concept might be
able to take on a legal, as well as a social, meaning. That was
clearly the intent of the international human rights documents
that employed the term "dignity" in their preambles or provisions. Individuals possessed an inherent dignity: this meant
that humans, and the state, needed to respect the dignity
humans possessed, and that gave humans some "rights"
against the abuse of their dignity by other humans and the
state. 48 But after declarations of the inherent dignity of
humans and provisions stating that humans should be allowed
to live under dignified conditions, or not have their dignity
humiliated or degraded, the international human rights documents, in seeking to particularize offenses against dignity, resorted to opaque generalities. Violations of dignity were
46 See id. at 667-71.
47 See id. at 669-71.
48 See id. at 677. Upon being questioned about the use of the term "human
dignity" in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt is reported to have argued that the term's purpose was to "emphasize that every
human being is worthy of respect.., it was meant to explain why human beings
have rights to begin with." Id.
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associated with "cruel," "inhumane," "indecent," or "outrageous" practices, but those terms were not spelled out.4 9 In
short, post-World War II conceptions of dignity firmly equated
it with universal human characteristics, potentially spawning
legal rights, but, with the exception of the protection of war
prisoners and enemies from treatments embargoed by the Geneva Convention and its Protocols, it was hard to know to what
50
those human rights amounted.
Among other scholars, 5 1 Christopher McCrudden has
taken these notions and attempted to identify what might be
called a "core" meaning of dignity, composed of three elements. 5 2 The first element is "that every human being possesses an intrinsic worth, merely by being human." 5 3 Here we
see the recalibrated version of dignity in place, the "inner transcendental kernel" inherent in human existence. 5 4 The next
element of dignity is "that this intrinsic worth should be recognized and respected by others." 5 5 It follows from this proposition that "some forms of treatment by others are inconsistent
with, or required by, respect for this intrinsic worth."5 6 The
third element of dignity is the "claim that recognizing the intrinsic worth of the individual requires that the state should be
seen to exist for the sake of the individual human being, and
not vice versa."5 7 The content of this third element, "the detailed implications . . . for the role of the state vis-d-vis the
49

See ANDREw CLAPHAM,

HUMAN RIGHTS

OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS

545-46 (2006). Clapham has identified "four aspects" of the "concern for [human]
dignity:" "the prohibition of all types of inhuman treatment, humiliation, or degradation by one person over another", "the assurance of the possibility for individual
choice and the conditions for 'each individual's self-fulfillment,' autonomy, or selfrealization"; "the recognition that the protection of group identity and culture may
be necessary for the protection of personal dignity"; and "the creation of the
necessary conditions for each individual to have [his or her] essential needs satisfied." It is hard to imagine how a "non-state actor," interested in implementing
such "aspects," might define his or her "obligations." Id. (footnotes omitted).
50
See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (providing more detail on the protections offered to
prisoners under the Third Geneva Convention).
51 Other scholars who have written on dignity include, in addition to ROSEN,
supra note 18, Wai Chee Dimock, Don Herzog, and Jeremy Waldron, in JEREMY
WALDRON, DIGNITY RANK AND RIGHTS (2012).

52

See McCrudden, supranote 22, at 679.

53

Id. at 680.
54 See Michael Rosen, Dignity: The Case Against, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN
DIGNITY 146-54 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013).
55
See McCrudden, supranote 22, at 679.
56
Id.
57
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individual" of accepting the first two elements of dignity's core
meaning, remains uncertain. 58
Thus, just what individual dignity consists of remains elusive. Dignity exists and is deserving of respect. However, being
respectful of it apparently not only requires individual members of the public to forego some treatment of others and
mandatorily engage in other treatment, but also for the state to
respect the dignity of individuals as well by simultaneously
refraining from some treatments, and enforcing other treatments. But the concept of dignity in this form remains burdened with philosophical objections to its coherence or
usefulness. 5 9
Two common objections to this conception of dignity have
been posed: first, if the "inner transcendental kernel" of human
dignity is equated with morality, we are still no closer to a
concrete understanding of the concept because "moral" conduct among humans is not self-evident; second, that even if
that objection could be surmounted, equating human dignity
with morality fails to provide guidance for situations in which
moral principles seem to point in opposing directions, as in the
60
case of assisted suicide.
Thus, we seem to have arrived at something of a conundrum in contemplating the present state of the concept of dignity. On the one hand, its invocation, largely as an abstraction,
has been growing in international and domestic legal documents 61 and will continue to grow as the connections between
dignity, autonomy, equality, and respect for the rights of others
come to resonate. 6 2 On the other hand, dignity has had severe
difficulties establishing what might be called its substantive
content, and for that reason it has been criticized as lacking
philosophical integrity-perhaps serving as a placeholder or
Id. at 680.
See Rosen, supra note 54, at 143-54 (summarizing six objections to the
usefulness of dignity as a descriptive or normative idea, only two of which are
discussed in this Article).
60 Id. at 147-51.
61
Examples of United States Supreme Court majority opinions affirming the
principle of "dignity" are American Federationof Labor v. American Sash and Door
Co., 335 U.S. 538, 542 (1949), Rochin v. California,342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958), Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992), Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002), and Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). Earlier references to "dignity" can be found in
Justice Frank Murphy's dissents in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) and
Homma v. Patterson,327 U.S. 759, 760 (1946) (per curiam). For an examination
of the different senses in which the Court has used the notion of dignity, see Leslie
Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudenceof Dignity, 160 U. Penn. L. Rev. 169 (2011).
See McCrudden, supra note 22, at 685-94.
62
58
59
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facade for other less resonant values. 6 3 Like other majestic
concepts such as liberty and equality, the notion of dignity
does not have any operational legal content. It does not in itself
confer concrete rights and cannot decide cases. The puzzle is
how to employ a concept whose precise legal understandings
and consequences seem highly uncertain.
D.

European Tort Law's Reaction

The source of tort law in the countries of continental Europe is in each instance a legislatively-enacted civil code, rather
than (as in England and the United States) the common law.6 4
In tort cases, European courts apply civil code provisions that
are sometimes very general. 65 Tort law thus comes from the
top-down, rather than from the bottom-up, as in the case-bycase approach of the common law. 6 6 Consequently, the civil

law approach has the potential to begin with a concept such as
dignity and generate "unified" dignitary torts rights and liabilities from this starting point.
It turns out that the starting points for civil law are even
more general than this, and the top-down unification that has
occurred under the concept of dignity has proceeded from very
broad principles. For example, the core provision of the French
Civil Code that bears on tort liability provides only that an act
"which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose
fault it occurred, to compensate it."67 In 1970, a separate provision addressing rights of privacy was added, stating that
"[elveryone has the right to respect for his private life." 6 8 Because privacy rights had previously been protected pursuant to
the more general provision, this was regarded merely as a codification rather than as an expansion. 6 9 Similarly, although the
German Civil Code is more detailed in many respects, the core
63 See Rosen, supra note 54, at 143-54.
64 See The World Factbook: Legal System, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/210O.html
[https:/
/perma.cc/MVV2-LFDX] (last visited Aug. 28, 2018).
65 See Vivienne O'Connor, Practitioner'sGuide: Common Law and Civil Law
Traditions, INT'L NETwORK TO PROMOTE THE RULE OF L. 1, 11, 13-14 (Mar. 2012),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2015/Common%20and%2OCivil%20
Law/620Traditions.pdf [https: //perma.cc/ZS3K-LU6Y].
66 See id. at 13.
67

CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] [CIVIL CODE], art. 1382 (Fr.), http://www.fd.ulisboa.pt/

wp-content/uploads/2014/1 2/Codigo-Civil-Frances-French-Civil-Code-englishversion.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX8P-KEYP] (English translation).
68 Id. at art. 9, http://www.fd.ulisboa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/
Codigo-Civil-Frances-French-Civil-Code-english-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YX8P-KEYP] (English translation).
69 See CEES VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 187 (2d ed. 2013).
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provision on which decisions protecting the rights associated
with dignitary torts is very general: "A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health,
freedom, property or another right of another person is liable to
make compensation to the other party for the damage arising
70
from this."
Another unifying force in Europe is the tendency of civil law
commentators to classify and categorize features of tort law in
ways that only partially overlap with common law tort thinking.71 Such scholars play a more important role in law identification for European courts than common law scholars in their
countries. 72 Scholarly contributions have resulted in a more
explicit and separate treatment of the interests protected by
different torts in European treatises on tort liability. 73 Nothing
quite equivalent or analogous can be found in U.S. torts treatises, which are more likely to simply mention the interest a
particular tort protects when addressing that tort. 7 4 The common law proceeds from case-to-case until a unifying principle
is recognized or simply emerges. 75 In contrast, the civil law
approach tends toward unification by beginning with the effort
76
to identify categories of interests that different torts protect.
This tendency has resulted in France and Germany paying
more attention than the United States to the concept of dignity.
Thus, in discussing the category of protected interests, commentators on French, German, and other European tort law
refer to a right of "personality" that is protected by liability for
70 BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 823(1), translated at
https: //www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englisch-bgb/englisch-bgb html#p3484
[https://perma.cc/LV9W-LRBJi (Ger.).
See generally VAN DAM, supranote 69.
71
72 See John Henry Merryman & Rogelio Perez-Perdomo, German Legal Science: Legal Scholars, in THE CIVIL LAW 510-11 (1969) (discussing the role legal

scholars have had in contributing to German civil law), John Henry Merryman, On
the Convergence (andDivergence) of the Civil and the Common Law, 17 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 357, 375-79 (1981) (describing the role of "general principles of law" in
determining the degrees of convergence and divergence of civil and common law
systems).
73
See, e.g., vAN DAM, supra note 69, at 167-222 (discussing how various
rights, such as the right to life, the right to physical integrity, the right to physical

health, and the right to mental health are treated in various European countries).
74
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAw 299, 308
(5th ed. 2017) (discussing the interests protected by the tort of invasion of privacy); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1117, 1197-98 (2000) (discussing
interests protected by invasion of privacy torts).
75 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 104 (2009).
76

Id, at 107.
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such wrongs as invasion of privacy and defamation. 77 The German high court, or "BGH," has expressly recognized a general
personality right as being protected by the above-quoted provision, 7 8 referring to Article 1 of the Basic Law (in effect, the
German constitution), which provides that "[hiuman dignity
shall be inviolable[,]" and Article 2, which refers to the "right to
free development of [thel personality." 79 The right of personality accordingly serves as the express rubric under which European courts consider the relevant tort rights.
Although these developments of the dignity theme are more
advanced than those that have occurred in the U.S., the potential unifying effect of this approach is yet to be fully realized,
even in Europe. European courts have not fully elaborated all
the components of a right of personality protected by tort liability. For example, the prominent French cases all seem to involve privacy rights and are characterized as such, 0 although
in one privacy case, the French high court, or Cour de Cassation, referred to the freedom of the press as subject to "[rlespect
de la digniti de la personne humaine" ("respect for the dignity
of the human person")."' And one of the early German decisions that made express reference to a right of personality
("Pers6nlichkeitsrecht7)recognized that in privacy cases, the

concept cannot decide outcomes deductively:
Admittedly, however, the notion of a general Pers6nlichkeitsrecht has the breadth of a general clause and is ill-defined.
Just as the dynamic nature of personality cannot be kept
within fixed limits, in the same way the substance of the
general Pers6nlichkeitsrechteludes definitive determination.
The right of the person to respect for his dignity and the free
development of his personality is ...

a "source right" which

gives rise to the concrete shapes which it takes in relation to
the manifold personality values of the individual, his vital
interests, and relations with his environment ....

The ex-

tended protection of personality will continue to derive its
support precisely from . .. the principles laid down in the

case law for their application.8 2

77
See, e.g., VAN DAM, supranote 69, at 184 (explaining the concept of personality rights).
78
See id.
79
See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIc LAW], art. 1, cl. I (Ger.), translatedathttps://

www.gesetze-im-internet. de/englisch-gg/englisch-gg.html#p0026
[https://
perma.cc/G2WP-7QTK].
80
See WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., ToRT LAw 152-59 (2000).
81
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Nov.
4, 2004, Bull. civ. II, No. 486 (Fr.).
82

VAN GERVEN,

supra note 80, at 144-45.
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In short, the experiences of France and Germany suggest
that in civil law systems, once a "personality" or "dignitary" tort
is perceived as something of a unified entity, the unity first
occurs at a high level of generality. The backing and filling that
must take place to specify the discrete aspects of the "right of
personality" may take considerable time to fully occur.
II
THE DIGNITARY TORTS IN AMERIcA: THE SEARCH FOR
UNIFICATION

It is no surprise that during the same period that the modem concept of dignity was crystallizing and being employed in
public discourse across the globe, American legal scholars began to discern a role for dignity in tort law. During this period,
the modem concept of dignity had come into its own. Preoccupation within western tort law with dignity, peace of mind, and
personality resonated with these broader developments.
In this Part, we recount modem American torts scholars'
interest in dignity and show why their flirtation with "unification" of the dignity torts never proceeded very far. We first
identify and describe the dignitary torts. We then examine the
efforts of William Prosser and some of his contemporaries to
understand the commonalities among these torts. Finally, we
identify one of the reasons their project eventually terminated,
largely unsuccessfully: the interests that dignitary torts protect
are simply too different to warrant treating them all under the
same rubric.
A.

Identifying the Dignitary Torts

The corpus of dignitary torts in American common law has
never been terribly precise, at least in part because courts and
scholars have tended to classify and then analyze torts based
on the applicable standard of care (intent, negligence, or strict
liability), and to a lesser extent, based on the kind of injury
(physical, emotional, or economic) that a tortious act causes.
Classification based on the interest that a set of torts protects,
such as dignity, cuts across these more frequently employed
and more conventional tort categories.
In this section, we identify and specify the characteristic
features of the torts that have sometimes been identified as
dignitary. These include battery, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (lIED), and the various forms of invasion of privacy. We think that, although false imprisonment is
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almost never included in the catalogue of dignitary torts, 83 it
belongs there too.
1.

Offensive Battery

Battery is an ancient tort with roots in the common law
writ of trespass vi et armis.84 Battery constitutes making, or
causing, intentional contact with the body of another person.8 5
Many batteries cause physical harm, and in such instances
this is the principal injury. 6 Even when there has been no
physical injury, however, intentionally making physical contact
with another person without express or implied consent is offensive and therefore actionable.8 7
2.

False Imprisonment

False imprisonment is also a linear descendant of the old
action of trespass.8 8 False imprisonment is the intentional and
wrongful restriction of an individual's freedom of movement.8 9
Confining an individual in a closed room or space or detaining
an individual in a retail store on suspicion of shoplifting, for
example, may constitute false imprisonment. Like offensive
battery, false imprisonment is actionable even when confinement has not caused the plaintiff physical harm. 90 Rather,
confinement itself is a discrete form of interference with bodily
autonomy.91
83 But see Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1005-07 (1964) (providing the

only known example of an author classifying false imprisonment as a dignitary
tort).
84 See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 402-03 (4th ed.
2002).

85
86
87

See ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 25.
See icL at 26.
See id. at 25-26.

88 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 68 (1941); see also
PAGE KEETON & ROBERT E. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 46-47

(1971).
89 See 32 AM. JUR. 2D False Imprisonment § 7 (2007).
90 See William L. Prosser, IntentionalInfliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort,
37 MICH. L. REv. 874, 880 (1939) ("Virtually from the beginning mental suffering
has been a recognized element of damages in ...

false imprisonment ....

Very

often in such actions the mental distress has been the only substantial damage
sustained.").
91 See PROSSER, supranote 88, at 69 ("[T]he tort is complete with even a brief
restraint of the plaintiffs freedom"); see, e.g., Gadsden Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton,
103 So. 553, 554-55 (Ala. 1925) (awarding plaintiff damages because, despite no
physical harm, plaintiff was denied bodily autonomy-she was not free to leave).
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Defamation

Actions for defamation-slander (oral) or libel (written)were originally subject to the jurisdiction of the English ecclesiastical courts, but by the seventeenth century they had become
lodged in the common law courts.

92

Common law defamation

amounts to strict liability for publication (communication to a
third-party or parties) of false information that is damaging to a
person's reputation. 9 3 Liability for defamation protects against
the harm that results from having one's good name, one's reputation, diminished. 9 4 Sometimes this harm is purely economic,
but sometimes it is emotional. 95 The defendant is held liable
because in the absence of privilege (as discussed below), the
common law seems to accord no particular value to a statement that is damaging to another's reputation. 96 Truth may be
a defense, 9 7 but prima facie the defendant speaks or writes at
his peril.
Liability for defamation, however, is subject to a conditional privilege if the defendant and the third party have a
common interest and the communicated information furthers
that interest. 9 8 This privilege is overcome by a showing that
the statement about the plaintiff was made with malice-i.e.,
with a desire to harm the plaintiffs reputation and thereby to
harm the plaintiff.9 9 In some jurisdictions it is sufficient to
overcome the privilege if the defendant knows the defamatory
statement is false or recklessly disregards whether it is true or
false. 100

4.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In contrast to the much older actions for battery, false
imprisonment, and defamation, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (lIED) was not expressly
recognized until the 1930s. 10 1 lIED is actionable when the
92 See Baker, supranote 84, at 436-46.
93 See PROSSER, supra note 88, at 816-17.
94 DOBBS, supra note 74, at 1117; see BAKER, supra note 84, at 443-44;
PROSSER, supra note 88, at 810.
95
See BAKER, supra note 84, at 443-44; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at
299 (noting that defamation can have an Impact on finances, honor, and dignity).
96 See PROSSER, supranote 88, at 821-23.
97
See ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 300-01.
See PROSSER, supranote 88, at 821-23, 837.
98
See id. at 849.
99
See Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on
100
Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 820 (1964).
See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
101
Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035-41 (1936); see also Prosser, supra note 90, at
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defendant "by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
...causes severe emotional distress." 10 2 One view of the interest lIED protects sees it as the emotional analog to the physical
interest that battery protects. 103 Just as every person has a
right not to be intentionally touched without consent, every
person has a right not to be intentionally subjected to emotional distress. 10 4 On this view, the requirements that the conduct causing distress be extreme and outrageous and the
resulting distress be severe merely reflect pragmatic concerns
regarding the risk of fraudulent claims and excessive litigation.
A slightly different view is that the interest in emotional
tranquility is not as important or worthy of protection as physical security until the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs
suffering both rise to the level required by the elements of
lIED. 105 Only at that point do the two types of interests become
of equivalent significance.
5.

Invasion of Privacy

The four causes of action for invasion of privacy are also of
recent vintage. 10 6 The composite category of invasion of privacy is Prosser's doing. 107 Over a twenty-year period, he took
the original Warren and Brandeis contention that there should
be a cause of action for unwanted publicity, 1 0 8 identified a
number of subsequently-decided cases, and on the basis of
these cases extended the notion to include three other categories as well: intrusion on solitude, false light, and commercial
appropriation. 109 Prosser called all four causes of action invasion of "privacy," and the category has stuck. Just as privacy
879-87 (noting a number of cases from the 1930s that openly acknowledged and
based decisions on Intentional infliction of emotional distress, moving away from
the previous rationales of false promises n contractual settings or of trespass).
102
103

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAw INST. 1965).
See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HIsTORY 105

(expanded ed. 2003).
104 See id.
105
See Fowler V. Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Re-Examination of the Basis
for Liabilityfor Emotional Distress, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 426, 430-33 (1938).
106
See John W. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv.
1093, 1093 (1962).
107 See Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, Prosserand His Influence, 6
J. TORT L. 27, 58 (2013).
108 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193, 214-15 (1890).
109 See Abraham & White, supra note 107, at 58-61.
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itself is composed of very different elements, 1 10 the privacy
torts involve different kinds of conduct, and therefore, must be
separately treated.
a.

Intrusion

Intrusion on a private space or conversation is actionable
when the intrusion is "highly offensive to a reasonable person.""' The paradigmatic cases involve eavesdropping and
peeping toms. 112 Although some cases have held that actually

accessing the information obtained by the invasion is not required, 113 clearly the core interest this tort protects is the right
to keep others from witnessing, hearing, or viewing what is
private.
The requirement that the intrusion be highly offensive
might in theory sometimes turn on the method of intrusion but
instead almost always actually turns on the character of what
the intrusion reveals to the defendant. 114 There is a difference
between spying on a family at its kitchen table and recording
what goes on in the bedroom. Nonetheless, an intrusion may
be offensive not because the information revealed is embarrassing, but simply because it is confidential-a bank transaction, for example." 5
b.

Public Disclosure

Disclosure of facts concerning another person's private life
is actionable if it would be "highly offensive to a reasonable
person" to have the matter publicized and the matter is not of
"legitimate concern to the public." 1 6 As a practical matter, the
two prongs of this test will often be related because the disclosure of private information is most likely to be highly offensive
when it has no legitimate news value. 117
110
See ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM ch. 2-3 (1967); see also Ruth
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 440-56 (1980); Daniel J.
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REv. 477, 482-83 (2006).
111 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).

112
See, e.g., Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 178 (Iowa 2011) (considering
a video camera installed in a bathroom); Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239,
241 (N.H. 1964) (considering the bugging of a tenant's apartment by landlord).
113 See KeoppeL 808 N.W.2d at 178-82.
114 See, e.g., Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 768-69 (N.Y. 1970)
("Privacy is invaded only if the information sought is of confidential nature and the
defendant's conduct was unreasonably intrusive.").
115 See id.at 769-71.

116
117

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652D (AM. LAw INST. 1977).

See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1228-30 (7th Cir. 1993).
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False Light

This tort is actionable when the defendant publicizes a
matter that places the plaintiff in a false light that would be
highly offensive to the reasonable person and the defendant
knows of the false light or recklessly disregarded it. 118 In many
cases, there is little, if any, daylight between false light and
defamation, or between false light and lIED, although there
may be occasional instances in which only false light will be
actionable. In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., for example, the claim was for portraying the poverty and stoic attitude
of the plaintiff after the death of her husband. 119 This may not
quite have been defamation or lIED, but the claim for false light
was actionable. 120
d.

CommercialAppropriation

The use of the plaintiffs name or likeness for commercial
purposes without consent is actionable. 121 For the most part,
this tort protects commercial and economic, rather than intangible, interests. 1 2 2 But in some instances, especially in the
early cases addressing the issue, 1 2 3 the interest the plaintiff
asserted was the right not to be associated with the defendant's
business or be portrayed in a manner that was embarrassing
or humiliating. The plaintiff in such cases is concerned about a
false impression that reflects poorly on him or her-the impression that there was consent to the use of his or her name or
likeness. In these situations, the appropriation tort thus protects against the presumed or anticipated diminution of respect for the plaintiff that results from being perceived to have
voluntarily associated with the defendant's commercial
activity.

118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
119 See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1974).
120 See id. at 246.
See ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 308; PROSSER, supra note 88, at 1056-57.
121
122 See Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1955); see also ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 308; PROSSER, supra note 88, at
1056 ("Although the protection of his personal feelings is still highly important in
such a case, the right invaded has also a commercial value." (footnote omitted)).
123 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905) ("[Ilt
cannot be that the mere fact that a man aspires to public office or holds public
office subjects him to the humiliation and mortification of having his picture
displayed in places where he would never go to be gazed upon. .. ").
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The most prominent torts scholars of the middle of the
twentieth century, varied though they may have been in other
respects, impliedly shared two related points of view. The first
was that nineteenth-century legal formalism was inadequate
for the needs of the twentieth century. 12 4 The second was that
such formalism artificially limited tort liability, which required
expansion. 125 These scholars focused much of their attention
on liability for accidental bodily injury. 126 Doctrinal limitations
on liability for negligence, whether for bodily injury or for other
forms of loss, contributed heavily to their dissatisfaction. 127
The cause of action for negligence had emerged out of two
ancient forms of action: trespass and case. 128 But even by the
mid-twentieth century, there was no general cause of action for
loss caused by negligence. 129 Negligence was a cause of action
mainly for bodily injury and property damage, and even that
cause of action had strong limitations, mostly in the form of noduty and limited-duty constraints on the imposition of liability. 130 There was limited liability for bodily injury arising out of
negligently maintained premises, 13 1 limited liability for negligently manufactured products, 1 32 limited liability for negligently inflicted emotional distress,1 3 3 limited liability for
"wrongful birth,' 1 3 4 and virtually no liability for negligentlycaused economic loss,'

35

to name just a few such doctrinal

limitations.
By the mid-1960s, some of these limitations on liability
were being dismantled and many torts scholars foresaw the
same fate for others. They certainly envisioned the development of a more general cause of action for negligence and many
thought that this would eventually evolve into strict liability for
124
125
126
127

SeeWHITE, supra note 103, at 12-15, 104-10.

133

See id. at 269-76.

See id. at 106-12.
See id. at 104-10.
See id. at 146; see also Albert Ehrenzweig, Note, Loss-Shifting and QuasiNegligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraf Case, 8 U. Cl-. L. REv. 729,
729-30 (1941); Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered:The Impact of
Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 549-51 (1948).
128
See WHITE, supranote 103, at 14-15.
129
See id. at 104-05.
130
See ABRAHAM, supranote 74, at 259-79.
131
See id. at 266-69.
132
See id. at 219-21.
See, e.g., Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 415-16 (R.I. 1997) (providing an example of how courts handle an action for "wrongful birth").
134

135

See ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 276-79.
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bodily injury and property damage. 13 6 This model of movement
toward unification through what was happening in the field of
negligence liability-which some tort theorists believed would
continue-may be what the scholars had in mind, in a vague
and general way, when some of them also began to identify a
series of different torts redressing emotional harm and others
identified torts that protected dignity.
We call this recognition of commonalities among different
torts, and the possibility that different torts would eventually
be treated as functionally falling under the same umbrella, the
idea of "unification." Just as mid-twentieth century tort scholars thought they were seeing the unification of negligence liability, as limitations on negligence liability faded away, they
seemed to be envisioning an analogous unified future for liability for dignitary and emotional loss. Their inchoate visions,
which we describe below, are tantalizing evidence of the tort
law future they were picturing.
1.

The 1930s to the 1950s: Initial Recognitions

William Prosser was arguably the most prominent torts
scholar of the twentieth century. 13 7 He was the author of the
leading mid-century treatise on the law of torts and he was the
Chief Reporter for the Restatement (Second)of Torts. 138 In the
first edition of his treatise, published in 1941, Prosser identified two sets of tort actions that, although not entirely novel,
were quite new in the case law and for which there was only
limited, if growing, support. 13 9 He included them in different
places in his book, which was organized by chapters divided
into sections.140 One set of tort actions, which Prosser described as "Words and Acts Causing Mental Disturbance," was
placed in a section on "Intentional Interference with the Person," which also included sections on assault, battery, and
false imprisonment. 14 1 The other set of tort actions was placed
in a chapter entitled "Miscellaneous Torts," and was described
as "Right of Privacy." 14 2 Over time, the first set of actions
136

See generally ROBERT E. KEETON, COMPENSATION SYSTEMS: THE SEARCH FOR A

VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO NEGLIGENCE LAW (1969) (providing a summary of this
attitude).
137
See Abraham & White, supra note 107, at 28.
138

See id.

139
140
141
142

See
See
See
See

PROSSER, supra note 88, at 2-4.
id. at ix-xiii.
ic at 2.
id. at 1050.
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would be relabeled "intentional infliction of emotional distress"
(lIED), and the second set "privacy."
Prosser's early treatment of intentional infliction of mental
suffering and privacy actions suggested that he was interested
in their common features, with a view to folding them into a
generic action protecting something like the right of "personality" that we described above as having a place in European tort
law. 14 3 In introducing the "mental disturbance" action, Prosser
stated that "[iln recent years the courts have tended to recognize the intentional causing of mental or emotional [damage] as
a tort." 144 Later in the section, after citing comparatively few
cases, most of which involved actions brought against common
carriers for breach of a contract of safe passage, Prosser stated
that "[slo far as it is possible to generalize from the cases, the
rule which seems to be emerging is that there is liability only
for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by society,
of a nature which is especially calculated to cause and does
cause mental damage of a very serious kind." 14 5
He picked up the same theme later. In introducing the
"Right of Privacy" section, Prosser stated that "[tlhe majority of
the courts which have considered the question have recognized
the existence of a right of 'privacy,' which will be protected
against interferences which are serious, and outrageous, or
beyond the limits of common ideas of decent conduct." 14 6
Then, after subdividing "privacy" actions into those intruding
on a person's solitude, publicly disclosing "private" information, and commercially appropriating elements of an individual's personality, Prosser declared that the "privacy" torts were
essentially about "protection of the plaintiffs peace of mind
against unreasonable disturbance." 14 7 As such, he predicted,
"the great majority" of privacy torts seemed likely to be "absorbed" into "the 'new tort' of intentional infliction of mental
suffering" once it "receives general recognition." 14 8
143
145

See supra Part II.
PROSSER, supra note 88, at 54.
Id. at 65.

146

Id.

144

at 1050.

147 I& at 1053-54.
148 Id. at 1054. Prosser was accurate with respect to the comparatively small
number of cases that had allowed recovery for intentional acts causing "mental
disturbance" without accompanying physical injury or involving conduct that
qualified for assault, battery, or false imprisonment. He was also accurate about
the growing number of cases, in the first three decades of the twentieth century,
allowing recovery for acts that did not necessarily lower the complainant's reputation but subjected him or her to public embarrassment, degradation, or humiliation. These included cases stating that the plaintiff endorsed a product or had
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Prosser's intuition that "privacy" cases might be best un-

derstood as a subcategory of cases allowing recovery for emotional harm was shared by a number of other American
commentators in the 1930s and 1940s. As they became aware
that the courts were tending to award recovery in two sorts of
cases, those in which plaintiffs had suffered emotional harm
without any accompanying physical injury and those in which
plaintiffs had complained of being humiliated, degraded, or embarrassed without any consequent loss of reputation, commentators began to search for the common features linking those
cases.
In 1938, Fowler V. Harper and Mary Coate McNeely attempted to approach emotional harm cases by identifying the
"interests" at stake in them. 149 They began by noting that the
common interest invaded in such cases was thought to be "the
plaintiffs interest in peace of mind, emotional tranquility, or
freedom from emotional disturbances[,]" but to describe the
cases in that fashion was conclusory, because it equated an
"interest" with "its invasion," so a more precise analysis was
50

necessary.1

given consent to having his or her picture taken or to be interviewed. See, e.g.,
Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197-98 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1955); Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 79 (Ga. 1905); FosterMilburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W.
1076, 1077 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911); Goldberg v. Ideal Publ'g Corp., 210 N.Y.S.2d 928,
929-30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 61, 64
(N.C. 1938). They also included the use of a picture in a context likely to mislead
audiences about its subject. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 78 F. Supp. 305,
307, 309 (D.D.C. 1948); Martin v. Johnson Publ'g Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956); Metzger v. Dell Publ'g Co., 136 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890-91 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1955). And they included the association of the plaintiffs name or
likeness with statements likely to give a misleading impression of the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Leverton v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 192 F.2d. 974, 977-78 (3rd Cir. 1951); Gill
v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 239 P.2d 630, 634-35 (Cal. 1952) (en banc); Russell v. Books,
183 N.Y.S.2d 8, 31-32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); Sinclair v. Postal Tel. & Cable Co., 72
N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935). In those cases, the gist of the action was
not invariably that others would think less of the plaintiff; it was that a reasonable
person would find the defendant's conduct offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities. It did not seem to be necessary, to maintain an action, that a plaintiff
demonstrate that the statements or conduct of the defendant were factually false;
the question was simply whether a jury would find the conduct such that it would
cause an ordinary person mental distress.
See Harper & McNeely, supra note 105, at 426-27; see also Leon Green,
149
The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237, 239 (1932) (similarly emphasizing the
"interests" at stake in emotional harm cases, and concluding that many cases
described as "privacy" actions were actually attempts to protect an interest in
.personality").
150
See Harper & McNeely, supra note 105, at 426-27.
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Harper and McNeely then produced a catalogue of "interests" being protected in emotional harm cases. 15 1 Those interests included "bodily security," "courteous service and decent
treatment from public utilities," "the body of the dead," "the
memory of the dead," "the life of the unborn," and "domestic
relations." 15 2 The awkward language used to describe some of
those interests reflected the fact that they more accurately captured the factual settings in which courts had allowed recovery
for emotional harm than doctrinal categories capable of being
employed across a range of cases. They also defined the privacy torts so as to emphasize that at bottom they were connected to the maintenance of "emotional and mental
tranquility." 153
The most notable feature of Harper's and McNeely's catalogue of "privacy" interests was their identification of an "interest in personal dignity and self-respect." 15 4 They described
that interest as being "offended by insulting and abusive language, by proposals that offend the sense of decency and by the
creation of situations which expose the person to ridicule or
embarrassment."' 15 5 The "dignity" cases they surveyed had two
characteristics. One was the judicial employment of fictions,
such as the existence of a property interest or an interest in
reputation, or a technical physical touching, to allow recovery
where the gist of the action clearly lay in the emotional distress
triggered by the defendant's conduct. 15 6 The other was that
virtually all of the cases Harper and McNeely cited involved
incidents that occurred in public, a fact that contributed to the
plaintiffs distress. 157 Included were cases in which plaintiffs
were accused of shoplifting; ordered out of an amusement
park, office, or theater; or wrongfully evicted from their
homes. 158
Prosser's treatise and Harper and McNeely's article were
the most extended early treatments of the common features of,
or the common interests protected by, actions for emotional
harm, with a view toward formulating a generic tort. But there
were others. In 1954, for instance, Harry Kalven referred to
151

See id. at 427-45.

152

Id. at 427-445.

153
154
155
156

See id. at 463-64.
Id at 451.
Id.
See icL at 452-58.

157
158

See id.
See id. at 453.
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"emotional dignitary torts," 159 and in 1959, the first edition of
Kalven's and Charles Gregory's new torts casebook noted that
"the law protects emotional tranquility and personal dignity
from intentional invasion under many specific categories" of
0

torts.16

We should emphasize that it was never very clear exactly
what doctrinal structure Prosser and his contemporaries had
in mind when they wrote about the commonalities among the
dignitary torts. They were not naive enough to think that there
could be complete unification of the various causes of action.- 6 1 Exactly what they had in mind, or where they thought
the law governing these torts was headed, short of unification,
they never indicated. Perhaps they were simply trying to identify dignity as a common value underlying those various torts,
without fully realizing that the concept of dignity is a composite. Or perhaps, as we noted earlier, they were distracted, or
even misled, by the unification they were contemporaneously
seeing and hoping to see develop further with another general
tort concept, negligence.
Prosser, never a deep theorist, did not subsequently push
the unification theme any further. As he worked on subsequent editions of his treatise in the 1950s and 1960s, courts
continued to decide more cases involving the intentional infliction of emotional distress and privacy.' 6 2 In successive editions of his treatise, Prosser would expand the distinct and
separate coverage of both of those torts. 1 63 By 1960, Prosser
had published an article in which he sought to solidify the tort
of privacy as being composed of four distinct actions, cite additional cases in which the courts were entertaining those actions, point out that the elements of the actions were quite
different, and argue that the failure to recognize their differences had resulted in apparent "confusion" in the courts. 164
159 Harry Kalven, Jr., Recent Books, 32 'Ex. L. REv. 629, 629 (1954) (reviewing
CLARENCE MORRIS, MORRIS ON ToRs (1953)).
160

CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS

848 (1959).
161
See WHITE, supranote 103, at 104-13.
162

See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TOirrs 808-18 (4th ed.

1971) (citing numerous cases decided in the 1950s and 1960s); see also WILLIAM
L. PROSSER ET AL., ToRTs CASES AND MATERIALS 1002-52 (Victor E. Schwartz et al.
eds., 13th ed. 2015) ("Dean Prosser made a profound contribution to the law in
synthesizing and categorizing the case law discerning that the law falls into four
distinct rubrics that are exemplified by the following principal cases in this
chapter.").
163 See Abraham & White, supra note 107, at 56-58.
164 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).

20191

THE PUZZLE OF THE DIGNITARY TORTS

347

Prosser had come to believe that the torts he had once
thought of as variations of a generic action for "peace of mind"
did not have as much in common as he had suspected. 165 The
privacy torts had not been absorbed into a general tort of interference with "peace of mind," and in fact, those torts seemed to
have divergent elements and to be protecting different interests. 16 6 As Prosser put it:
Taking [the privacy torts] in order-intrusion, disclosure,
false light, and appropriation-the first and second require
the invasion of something secret, secluded or private pertaining to the plaintiff; the third and fourth do not. The second
and third depend on publicity, while the first does not, nor
does the fourth, although it usually involves it. The third
requires falsity or fiction; the other three do not. The fourth
involves a use for the defendant's advantage, which is not
67
true of the rest. 1
In contrast, the term "peace of mind" could cover an almost
limitless number of human reactions to the words or actions of
others, and it was clear that not all such reactions were actionable in tort. 168 In addition, invasion of "privacy" seemed an
inadequate way of describing some of the actions Prosser included in that category. 16 9 Meanwhile, the courts continued to
170
use the "privacy" rubric to decide a number of tort cases.
But once it became apparent, after the emergence of more such
cases, that "privacy" cases were seemingly not being absorbed
into the category of intentional infliction of emotional distress
cases; the common elements ostensibly connecting those acSee id. at 389.
See iCL
167
Id. at 407.
168
See ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 269-76.
169
By the fourth edition of his treatise, which appeared in 1971, Prosser was
prepared to declare that "as yet no decided case allowing recovery" in privacy had
appeared "which does not fall fairly within one of the four categories." PROSSER,
supra note 162, at 816.
But in disclosure cases, the complainants were not typically concerned with
the fact that information about them had been disclosed; often they had voluntarily participated in interviews. They were typically concerned with the disclosure
of information that they found embarrassing or humiliating, such as the fact that
they had once committed a robbery, been a prostitute, been a child prodigy, or
engaged in behavior that might appear coarse or eccentric. In some appropriation
cases, plaintiffs were not seeking to avoid publicity about their names or likenesses. They were simply seeking to capture the value of that publicity for themselves. And in false light cases, plaintiffs were not complaining about being
portrayed before the public at all but at being portrayed inaccurately. In short,
"privacy," as generally understood, did not seem to be what was principally at
stake in some of the cases Prosser grouped in that category.
170
E.g., Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
165

166
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tions-that they sought to redress emotional injuries for conduct thought of as going beyond the bounds of ordinary civil
conduct in intentionally disturbing "peace of mind"-were insufficiently precise to explain the several torts; and the "privacy" torts appeared to be a collection of quite diverse actions,
doctrinal clarity was lost in both intentional infliction of emotional distress and privacy cases.
Prosser's misgivings, however, were not always shared. In
the next decade, two other prominent scholars took up the
unification theme.
2.

The 1960s: John Wade and Alfred Bloustein on Peace

of Mind and Dignity
At that point, commentators began to search for a more
promising way to integrate "privacy" cases with others in which
recovery was primarily being sought for emotional harm. In the
early 1960s, two such commentators launched their searches
in reaction to Prosser's "Privacy" article. John Wade was Dean
of the Vanderbilt Law School, co-author (with Prosser) of the
leading torts casebook of the time, and a member of the Board
of Advisors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 17 1 Wade
sought to revive Prosser's 1941 suggestion that privacy actions
amounted to a subcategory of actions seeking recovery for
"mental disturbance" and would eventually be absorbed into a
generic action for damages based on emotional harm. 172 Wade
went further: he attempted to integrate actions for defamation
in that generic tort, hoping that by doing so, some of the
archaic, technical elements of defamation actions might be

eliminated. 173
Wade agreed with a court's statement that the interest protected in privacy cases was "peace of mind" and in defamation
cases the interest was "reputation," but felt that the two areas
had enough in common to merit "a careful study" of their relationship. 174 Most of his analysis of privacy cases was designed
to show that a large number of them, whether falling into Prosser's categories of true disclosure, false light, or appropriation,
were about creating a "false impression" of the plaintiff,
Ronald J. Rychlak, John Wade: Teacher, Lawyer, Scholar,65 MISS. L.J. 1, 1

171

(1995).
172

173
174

See Wade, supra note 106, at 1094.
See id. at 1109-20.
Id. at 1095-96.
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whether that impression lowered the plaintiffs reputation, and
17 5
whether statements made about the plaintiff were true.
Wade then suggested that if most privacy cases were "false
impression" cases, the overlap between the torts of invasion of
privacy and defamation was considerable. 17 6 This meant that
"the great majority of defamation actions can now be brought
for invasion of the right of privacy," and consequently, "many of
the restrictions and limitations of libel and slander can be
avoided." 17 7 It also meant that "[als lawyers come to realize
this, the action for invasion of the right of privacy may come to
supplant the action for defamation." 178 Wade noted that Prosser had recognized this possibility and expressed some concerns about it, stating that "the numerous restrictions and
limitations which have hedged defamation about for many
years" had served the interests of "freedom of the press and the
discouragement of trivial and extortionate claims[,]" and
should not be "circumvented in so casual and cavalier a fashion" by efforts to bring defamation actions as privacy
actions. 179
Wade, however, took a different view. He noted that judges
and legal writers over the years had condemned the "anomalies
and absurdities" of the common law of defamation and that
"the numerous detailed rules, which have resisted synthesis
into broad principles or standards" had hampered efforts to
reform defamation law through judicial decisions while "legislative reform" had been "generally ineffective" because it required "a complete revision of the whole system" of defamation
law and legislatures were not willing "to undertake a statutory
code covering the whole subject."' 8 0
Wade believed that "[tihe penetration of the law of privacy
into [the] field [of defamation] affords a splendid opportunity for
reform of the traditional law regarding the actionability of language which harms an individual's peace of mind or his reputation."'18 1 The reform could "take the customary common law
82
method of gradual judicial development." 1
"If the law of privacy then absorbs the law of defamation,"
Wade believed:

180

See id. at 1098.
See id. at 1095.
Id. at 1121.
Id.
Id. (quoting Prosser, supra note 164, at 401).
Wade, supranote 106, at 1121-22.

181

Id. at 1122.

182

Id.

175
176
177
178

179
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[I]t will merely afford a complete "unfolding" of the idea or
principle behind that law. Indeed, there is real reason to
conclude that the principle behind the law of privacy is much
broader than the idea of privacy itself, and that the whole law

of privacy will become a part of the larger tort of intentional
infliction of mental suffering. That tort would then absorb
established torts like assault and defamation and invasion of
the right of privacy and join them together with other innomi-

nate torts to constitute a single, integrated system of protecting plaintiffs peace of mind against acts of the defendant

intended to disturb it. 183
Two years after Wade's article appeared, Edward Bloustein
of N.Y.U. School of Law embarked upon a similar search, seeking to ground a generic action for emotional harm on the protection of "dignity."1 8 4

Bloustein argued that the

actions

Prosser had identified as protecting "privacy" were only concerned with that interest in a secondary sense: the core interest
they protected was rooted in the individuality of private
lives. 185 It was an interest in what Bloustein called "the individual['s] independence, dignity and integrity."'1 8 6
Bloustein attempted to show that none of the "interests"
Prosser's formulation saw privacy actions as protecting were
what Warren and Brandeis had associated with "the right of
privacy." 18 7

Rather, another interest lay at the base of the

privacy action. Bloustein analyzed each of the privacy actions
Prosser had catalogued in an effort to show that they were, at
bottom, actions designed to vindicate and protect human dignity.188 He concluded that "our Western culture defines individuality as including the right to be free from certain types of
intrusions. This measure of personal isolation and personal
control over the conditions of its abandonment is of the very
essence of personal freedom and dignity." 18 9 Such intrusions
"may be the occasion and cause of distress and embarrassment
but . . . [t]hey are wrongful because they are demeaning of
individuality
whether or not they cause emotional
1
9
trauma." o
Bloustein next turned to public disclosure cases, concluding that Prosser's characterization of the interest in reputation
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. at 1124-25.
See Bloustein, supranote 83, at 971.
See idL at 971-72.
Id at 971.
Id. at 970.
See iAL at 972-92.

189

Id.

190

Id. at 974.

at 973.
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supposedly being protected in those cases was not only "completely at odds with that of Warren and Brandeis" but also "at
odds with the cases." 19 1 Warren and Brandeis had maintained
that the right to privacy was "radically different" from defamation because it existed not only "to prevent inaccurate portrayal
19 2
of private life, but to prevent its being depicted at all."'
Bloustein also addressed the "name or likeness" cases,
now commonly referred to as appropriation cases. 19 3 His discussion was largely directed at demonstrating that Prosser's
characterization of such cases as invasions of a "proprietary"
19 4
interest, akin to an interest in property, was mistaken.
Bloustein argued that these cases were at least partly about
protecting against "assault[s] on individual personality and
95
dignity."1
Bloustein thereby made a powerful argument that the four
species of torts that Prosser had grouped under the rubric of
privacy could be better understood as dignitary torts. His formulation explained why some of those torts, at first glance, did
not seem to be protecting privacy at all and why some appeared
191 Id.at 978.
192 Id. at 978.
193 See ic at 985-91.
194 See id. at 986. Although some cases involved "special circumstances"
where, because the plaintiff was "a public figure, the use of his likeness or name
for commercial purposes involves the appropriation of a thing of value," the gravamen of the action, Bloustein believed, was that "the very commercialization of a
name or photograph [ I does injury to the sense of personal dignity." Id. at 988-89.
195 Id. Bloustein noted two California cases, based on the same episode, in
which a married couple was photographed embracing in their place of business.
The photograph was then published in two different articles on the subject of love.
One article attached a caption to the photograph which stated that it was an
example of "the wrong kind of love," consisting "wholly of sexual attraction and
nothing else." The other article merely included the photograph without comment. The plaintiffs sued both publishers. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 40 Cal. 2d.
224 (Cal. 1953); Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 38 Cal. 2d. 273 (Cal. 1952). In the case
with the caption, the court upheld an action in false light privacy; in the other
case, the complaint was dismissed on the ground that by embracing in public the
plaintiffs implicitly consented to having their photograph taken. Bloustein argued
that in the first case, publication of the photograph, combined with the caption,
"turn[ed] the otherwise inoffensive publication into one which is an undue and
reasonable insult to personality." The "false and stigmatic comment on character"
that accompanied the photograph "constitute[d] the actionable wrong." Bloustein
felt that publication of the photograph with the misleading caption "serve[d] the
same function" as an unconsented "use of [a] photograph for advertising purposes." In that respect, false light cases were protecting the same interest as
name and likeness cases. "Once it is recognized that the user of a name for
advertising reasons is wrongful because it is an affront to personal dignity,"
Bloustein maintained, "the underlying similarity between the advertising and
'false light' cases becomes apparent. The 'false light' and the advertising use are
merely two different means of publishing a person's name or likeness so as to
offend his dignity as an individual." Bloustein, supra note 83, at 992.
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to have little in common with others. In addition, his analysis
provided an explanation of the reason that Prosser, and subsequently Wade, had contemplated the possibility that the privacy torts, together with defamation and perhaps other torts
such as false imprisonment, assault, and nonphysical battery,
might eventually be subsumed in a general action for intentional infliction of mental suffering, representing what Wade
called "a single, integrated system of protecting . . . peace of
mind." 19 6 And although Bloustein was not very specific about
what the interest in "dignity" was actually composed of, the
possibility that "peace of mind"-a combination of respect for
the privacy, individuality, and feelings of human beingsflowed from the attribution of an intrinsic dignity in all persons
seemed intuitively plausible.
Thus, unpacking the "interest" in dignity seemed to be a
promising way for commentators and courts to surmount some
of the analytical confusion associated with the expansion of
privacy actions in torts. Before Bloustein's article, other scholars, including Prosser, had described some torts as protecting
an interest in "dignity." The first edition of Prosser's handbook
had noted that in battery actions, "[tihe element of personal
indignity involved always has been given considerable
weight," 19 7 and he had maintained, in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that the standard for whether a non-harmful
touching of another's body constituted a battery was whether it
offended "a reasonable sense of personal dignity." 198 As we
noted earlier, in 1954, Harry Kalven had referred to "emotional
dignitary torts," 19 9 and the 1959 edition of Kalven's and
Charles Gregory's torts casebook noted that "the law protects
emotional tranquility and personal dignity from intentional invasion under many specific categories" of torts. 20 0 Descriptions of a series of actions for emotional harm as "dignitary
torts" have continued to appear in commentary since the
1970s. 2 0 1 And we have previously noted the growing number
of articles associating actions for emotional harm with the pro20 2
tection of human dignity.
196
197

Wade, supra note 106, at 1125.
PROSSER, supra note 88, at 44-45.

198
199

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 (AM. LAw INST. 1965).
See Kalven, Jr., supranote 159, at 629.

200

GREGORY & KALVEN, JR., supra note 160, at 848.

201

Beginning with DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 509-39
(1974).
202 See sources cited, supranote 5.
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By the mid- 1960s, Prosser, Wade, Gregory, and Kalven
were at the peak of their influence. 20 3 Bloustein was younger,
20 4 Albut a faculty member at a major law school (N.Y.U.).
though he soon became President of Bennington College and
then Rutgers University, he still published in law reviews from
time to time. 20 5 Had these scholars continued to explore the
commonalities among the torts redressing intangible loss, and
especially the nature of the dignitary interests many of these
torts protect, torts scholarship and tort law's doctrinal structure might have moved in a different direction. The puzzle is
why this did not happen.
C.

The Diversity of Interests Protected

Part of the solution to this puzzle is that, as we showed
earlier, dignity is a concept associated with values that cluster
around the worth of the individual. The interests the dignitary
torts protect reflect these values. When the focus turns to individual torts, however, there has been a move from the general
concept of dignity to specific, and different, values connected to
20 6
the concept, which tort law seeks to preserve or uphold.
Prosser and contemporaries never seemed to have clearly recognized this point, although Prosser (as we noted) began to
have second thoughts about the issue when writing about privacy in the 1960s.
To reveal the challenge for unification that this phenomenon generates, it is necessary to tease out the different values
connected to the concept of dignity. Doing so involves a considerable amount of interpretation on our part, both because the
courts often have no need to address the precise interest that
the tort under consideration protects and the courts have had
no reason at all to examine what the different actions grouped
under the category of "dignitary torts" may or may not have in
common.
203
See Abraham & White, supra note 107, at 35-40 (recounting Prosser's
career in the 1960s); Vincent Blasi, Harry Kalven, Jr., 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 301,
302-03 (2011) (discussing Kalven's career and referencing his "most important
law review article," which was published in 1964); Hardy C. Dillard, A Tribute to
Charles 0. Gregory: Foreword, 53 VA. L. REV. 759, 760 (1967) (discussing Gregory's influence in the wake of his death); Rychlak, supra note 171, at 1-13 (discussing Wade's professional career).
204
See Thomas J. Frusciano, Leadership on the Banks: Rutgers' Presidents,
1766-1991, 53 J. RUTGERS U. LIBR. 1, 36 (1991).
205
See id.; see, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutionalas Well?, 46 TEX. L.
REv. 611 (1968).
206
See supra Part II.
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Each of the dignitary torts protects a core interest, although they sometimes also protect secondary interests. But
the different torts do not protect the same core interest.2 0 7 We
have discerned three distinct core interests that the dignitary
torts protect. At the core are protections against interferences
with liberty and personal autonomy; protections against
speech or conduct that embarrasses, humiliates, or shows blatant disrespect; and protections against communications that
diminish the regard that others have for the plaintiff.
1.

Liberty and Autonomy

Certain features of a person's individuality are so central to
being human that liberty and autonomy require that they be
off-limits to others without consent. 20 8 At the heart of individual liberty and autonomy is control over one's own body. 2 0 9 "It
is my body" is a sufficient answer to the question why others
may not touch you without your consent. 2 10 Battery protects
this interest: even a touching that causes no physical harm is
actionable in battery if it "offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity. "211 Spitting on the face of the plaintiff, for example, is an offensive battery.21 2 False imprisonment redresses a
similar interest. 2 13 Confining a person against his or her will
interferes with personal autonomy.
In the modem world, the secrecy and solitude of one's intimate affairs are also essential to individual liberty and autonomy. The form of invasion of privacy often termed "intrusion"
207

See Wi.

See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.06 (West 2011) (establishing consent
defense to assaultive conduct).
209
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) ("We
conclude, however, that urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control
over her destiny and her body, claims implicit in the meaning of liberty, require us
to [reach this outcome].")
210
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (quoting
Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.")).
211
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 19 (AM. LAw INsr. 1965).
212
See, e.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill.
553, 554 (Il. 1872) (noting that spitting
in a person's face is an act of indignity); Draper v. Baker, 21 N.W. 527, 530 (Wis.
1884) (holding that a jury verdict rendered against a defendant who spat in a
woman's face was not excessive).
213
See, e.g., Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 872 P.2d 559, 571 (Cal. 1994) (en banc)
("[T]he law of false imprisonment protects 'interests in personality closely akin to
those protected by the law of assault and battery.'").
208

20191

THE PUZZLE OF THE DIGNITARY TORTS

355

protects this interest. 2 14 As a practical matter, the more intimate the space or setting, the more offensive an intrusion on it
is likely to be. Although some cases have held that actually
accessing the information obtained by the invasion is not required, 2 15 clearly the core interest this tort protects is the right
to keep others from witnessing, hearing, or viewing what is
private and intimate.
Finally, the interest in controlling use of one's name or
likeness has an affinity with the interests in controlling one's
body and intimate space. One's name and how one looks are
an essential part of an individual's identity. 2 16 Using part of

that identity without consent infringes on the individual's liberty and autonomy. The tort of commercial appropriation often
protects only the economic interest associated with unauthorized use.2 17 But there are also appropriation cases in which
the interest protected is the right to not have one's name or
likeness involved in commerce at all, or only involved in a manner that is in keeping with one's conception of oneself. 2 18
These cases protect liberty and autonomy.
There is no doubt that, although the torts of battery, false
imprisonment, intrusion, and appropriation primarily protect
liberty and autonomy, those four torts sometimes simultane214 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM LAW INST. 1977) ("One who
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.").
215 See, e.g., Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 186 (Iowa 2011) (holding that
recording equipment did not have to be functional for the intrusion to be
actionable).
216 See Rebecca Adams, It's Not Just Girls. Boys Struggle with Body Image,
Too., HUFFINGTON POST, (Sep. 17, 2014, 1:10 PM), https://www.huffmgtonpost.
com/2014/09/17/body-image-boys-n_5637975.html
[https: //perma.cc/5T2KTRC2]; Michael Hedrick, How Our Names Shape Our Identity, WEEK, (Sep. 15,
2013) http://theweek.com/articles/460056/how-names-shape-identity [https:/
/perma.cc/8XLH-PA76].
217
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977) ("No
one has the right to object merely because his name or appearance is brought
before the public ....
It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of
appropriating to the defendant's benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or likeness that the right of privacy is invaded.").
218 A classic case from the earliest years of the privacy action is Pavesich v.
New EnglandLife Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). For modern examples, see
Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 447 F.Supp.2d 1008 (D. Minn. 2006) (antiabortion activist registered domain names incorporating the names of his opponents); Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589 (Ind. 2001) (professor created noncommercial websites and email accounts employing the names of his
former colleagues, then sent emalls to a number of universities nominating those
persons for academic positions and directing readers to the websites, which contained critical posts about the nominated individuals).
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ously, though secondarily, protect other interests. For example, what often makes an offensive battery offensive, even in the
absence of physical harm, is the defendant's intentional disregard of the plaintiffs right not to be touched. 2 19 The disregard
itself demeans the plaintiff, sending the message that the defendant does not regard him or her as worthy of bodily protection. Liability for battery protects against, or redresses, such
disrespect. Similarly, an intrusion on private space may produce emotional distress or embarrassment by virtue of what
the intruder has witnessed-for example, being seen naked by
all but one's intimates is embarrassing for most people. Liability for intrusion protects against such embarrassment. And
unauthorized use of one's name or likeness in certain circumstances may be embarrassing because of the inaccurate implication such use entails.
But these protections are secondary, and the torts are actionable, whether or not these secondary interests are involved,
as long as liberty and autonomy have been invaded. 2 20

How-

ever, there is little, if anything, in the other dignitary tortsdefamation, false light, lIED, or even in public disclosure-that
is directed as strongly at this interest in liberty and autonomy.
2.

Embarrassment,Humiliation, and Disrespect

Two of the other dignitary torts are directed primarily at
protecting against embarrassment, humiliation, and disrespect. First, the form of invasion of privacy called public disclosure applies when matters concerning another person's private
life are made public. 2 2 1 Usually, it is offensive to make the

embarrassing or
information public because it is
22 2
humiliating.
Second, the tort of IIED is actionable because intentionally
inflicting emotional distress on the plaintiff is most demeaning,
contemptuous, or disrespectful when the defendant's conduct
is extreme and outrageous. 2 2 3 In a sense, the fact that this
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burke, 457 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Mass. 1983)
219
("But an offensive touching is so only because of lack of consent. The affront to
the victim's personal integrity is what makes the touching offensive.").
See Ashcraft v. King, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900, 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing
220
battery action against doctor for blood transfusion where doctor exceeded the
terms of patient's consent).
221
See, e.g., Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998)
(enumerating the elements of the tort of public disclosure).
222
See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (finding
cause of action where a ifirm disclosed plaintiffs former life as a prostitute).
223

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

46 cmt. d (AM. LAw INST. 1965) ("Liability

has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and
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conduct is extreme and outrageous is what makes the conduct
demeaning, contemptuous, or disrespectful. 2 2 4 lIED also often
protects not only against disrespect, but also against the embarrassment and humiliation that typically accompany it, although the tort is actionable without them-for example, when
the distress plaintiff suffers constitutes or results from fear or
225
extreme irritation.
In contrast, the other dignitary torts have much less to do
with embarrassment, humiliation, and disrespect. Offensive
battery and intrusion may sometimes involve these interests,
since an unconsented-to touching or an intrusion into intimate
matters may produce such emotions. But these torts mainly
protect the liberty and autonomy interests we described above.
Defamation, false light, and commercial appropriation are also
at most concerned only secondarily with embarrassment and
humiliation. Those torts focus on the defendant's portrayal of
the plaintiff and the resulting way in which others perceive the
plaintiff. Embarrassment, humiliation, and disrespect may or
may not be consequences of such a portrayal, but protecting
against their occurrence is not the central object of the torts.
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.")
224
There are a number of early lIED cases n which conductors on trains
spoke harshly to female passengers in ways that, under the circumstances of that
time, would have been considered extreme and outrageous. In one such case, in
the female plaintiffs presence, a drunken conductor said to another passenger,
"She is a damn good-looking old girl, and I would like to meet her when she gets
off." Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, 53 S.W. 557, 558 (Tenn. 1899). Often the
defendants in those common carrier and similar cases were in a position of authority or at least control, thereby aggravating the demeaning character of their
statements or conduct. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814, 816 (Minn.
1926) (holding that school officials who accused a female high school student of
unchastity and threatened her with imprisonment are subject to liability). For a
collection of the early cases, see Prosser, supra note 88, at 57-62. The modem
cases involve various forms of ridicule, harassment, and repeated efforts at debt
collection, among other things. See, e.g., Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So.2d
396, 397 (Fla. 1958) (saying to a customer, "you stink to me"); Taggart v. Drake
Univ., 549 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Iowa 1996) (faculty member referring to plaintiff in
"sexist and condescending manner"); Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 612 (Md.
1977) (ridiculing plaintiffs stuttering); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 345 (Utah
1961) (detailing how debt collector placed late night telephone calls soliciting
sexual relations over a six month period and engaged in indecent exposure);
Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 146-47 (Va. 1974) (taking plaintiffs photograph under false pretense and then misleadingly using it at a trial to imply that
he may have committed a crime).
225
See, e.g., Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 147 (fear of being accused
of a crime); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Sillznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 284 (Cal.
1952) (fear of being physically harmed); Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (Va.
1991) (extreme irritation resulting from 340 hang-up calls by a disappointed
suitor).
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Diminished Regard of Others

Another important feature of one's individuality, and therefore dignity in the broad sense, turns on the regard of others.
Humans are relational beings; our welfare depends heavily on
the regard that others do or do not have for us. 2 2 6 As the
Supreme Court has said of defamation, "the individual's right
to the protection of his own good name 'reflects no more than
our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being.'" 2 2 7 Defamation, false light, and commercial appropriation (in certain of the cases involving noneconomic loss)
centrally protect this interest. The consequence of such interference may sometimes be embarrassment, humiliation, or disrespect, and damages awarded may consist of compensation
for this kind of suffering. The principal indignity involved in
these torts, however, is that a person has not been portrayed as
he or she truly is; the wrong lies in the misrepresentation of
something important about oneself.
It is obvious that this is not the core interest protected by
the other torts-battery, false imprisonment, intrusion, disclosure, or lIED. Those torts are not concerned with inaccurate
portrayal of, or misrepresentation about, the plaintiff. For intrusion and disclosure, the interest at stake is not accuracy at
all, but others gaining access to or publicizing something that
is in existence and is in fact accurate, or may be. And for lIED,
accuracy has little bearing one way or the other. Emotional
distress can be intentionally created by asserting something
true, something false, or by words or conduct that having nothing to do with what is true or false. And of course, neither
battery itself nor offensive battery are concerned in any way
with the regard that others have for the plaintiff.
4.

Taking Stock: The Consequences of the Incomplete
Coincidence of Interests

In describing the interests that the dignitary torts protect,
we teased out a number of different concepts that surface in
that analysis: liberty, autonomy, respect, humiliation, embarrassment, and the regard of others. It is no stretch to describe
all these terms and the concepts they represent as involving
dignity or infringement of dignity. Each has something to do
226 See Christopher von Rueden, How Social Status Affects Your Health, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.nytlmes.com/2014/12/14/opinion/sunday/
how- social-status-affects-your-health.html [https: //perma.cc/L8H2-AAC6].
227 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)).
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with the worth of the individual. In this sense, the practice of
referring to the torts in question as dignitary is accurate and
unobjectionable, and, to some extent, assists in understanding
what they have in common. Given this common thread among
the torts, it is no surprise that so many scholarly references to
the "dignitary" torts seem to presuppose that what makes a tort
dignitary can go without saying.
Our analysis, however, reveals two difficulties that are entailed in attempting to go beyond this form of simple labeling.
First, even setting aside exactly what constitutes dignity and
an infringement on dignity, in at least some instances, most of
the putative dignitary torts also are actionable to redress nondignitary interests. Thus, battery can cause physical harm; it
may also be offensive to be physically harmed by an intentional
contact, but the principal concern in such cases is the harm
rather than the offense. Dignity is a secondary interest in most
such cases. Defamation may cause economic harm without
infringing dignity, as when someone is incorrectly said to have
died or no longer to be practicing medicine. In the privacy
torts, there is a similar division. Intrusion may infringe dignity,
but it may instead simply be objectionable, as when a third
party views someone's bank transaction. The same is sometimes true of false light, and it is obviously true of commercial
appropriation, which is most often about something other than
dignity. For this reason, calling these torts dignitary is a partially inaccurate description. Sometimes this term just does
not fit.
Second, as we have seen, dignity is a complex concept,
comprised of a series of interests. But not all the dignitary torts
protect all those interests. And even when the torts protect a
combination of core and sometimes-secondary interests they
are often different combinations. Offensive battery, intrusion,
and certain cases of commercial appropriation are centrally
concerned with liberty and autonomy, whereas the other torts
are not. Intrusion and IIED are centrally concerned with embarrassment, humiliation, or disrespect, whereas the other
torts are not. And defamation, false light, and certain cases of
commercial appropriation are centrally concerned with the regard of others for the plaintiff, whereas the other torts are not.
This incomplete coincidence of protected interests goes a
long way toward explaining why so little analysis or elaboration
of what makes these causes of action dignitary torts exists.
They are in fact "dignitary" torts, but they protect different
forms of dignity. It is these different forms of dignitary protec-
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tion-we have contended that there are three such forms-that
underwrite the torts, and not the more general concept of dignity. Because of the variety of interests involved, it is difficult
for the concept of dignity to bear any operational weight or do
any doctrinal work. Dignity is a general and complex concept
from which it would be difficult to deduce rules that would
decide individual cases. That is a large part of the explanation
for the failure of the concept of dignity to ever be developed in
the tort literature or case law addressing these dignitary torts.
This has had three important consequences. First, it is
often not necessary for the courts to make very extended or
deep references to the interests that a particular tort protects.
For example, that battery and especially offensive battery at its
core protects liberty and bodily autonomy usually can go without saying. Similarly, public disclosure at its core protects the
privacy of intimate or confidential information about oneself.
Only when a fact situation poses issues at the periphery, rather
than at the core of those and the other dignitary torts, is there
occasion for a court to drill-down into the granular details of
the interest that a cause of action protects. 2 2 8 This phenomenon naturally impedes the development of self-conscious articulations of the nature of the interests that a particular tort
protects.
Second, because different torts protect different core interests but sometimes secondarily protect interests at the core of
other torts, there is complicated and varied overlapping of the
interests protected. The whole messy picture discourages efforts to tease out and identify what interests which torts protect. The mere potential for greater descriptive insight without
any corresponding doctrinal or operative impact appears,
therefore, to be insufficient to tempt the courts to make the
effort.
For these reasons, there has been virtually no examination
or analysis of what makes the dignitary torts "dignitary," or the
particular interests that the different dignitary torts sometimes
protect in common. A reflexive tendency to label them "dignitary" frequently manifests itself, but without any analytical or
theoretical follow-up. 2 2 9 Our analysis has suggested that such

follow-up would have revealed that the torts are related, and
See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1233-34 (7th Cir.
228
1993) (holding that the depiction of plaintiff as a man who drank heavily, neglected his children, and was pathetically amorous when drunk was not highly
offensive).
See the discussion of articles on "dignitary torts," supra note 5.
229
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some of them closely related, but not all are related in the same
way.
This has led to a third consequence, which implicates the
process by which common law tort actions emerge and develop
in the United States. Although common law torts may protect
multiple and overlapping interests, the theory governing the
bringing of tort actions in American courts is that each tort is a
discrete entity, with its own doctrinal requirements. In that
respect, actions in defamation, in one or another form of privacy, and in lIED, although they might each be efforts to redress a loss of "dignity," are treated as separate from one
another. Courts and commentators have devoted a good deal
of attention to demonstrating why an action based on a set of
facts might fail if brought in defamation but succeed if brought
in disclosure or in false light privacy. 2 30 These efforts reflect
the fact that protecting "dignity" is not easily reduced to the
vindication of a single interest or, seemingly, to the vindication
of any interest that lies unprotected in other torts. Thus, there
may well be an inherent incompatibility between the American
common law system and the development of any generic tort
action designed to protect dignity. We will return to this general point in Part IV.
In summary, we believe that all these consequences of the
incomplete coincidence of protected interests in the concept of
dignity provide reasons for why the project of creating a unified,
generic "dignity" tort action never got off the ground. And there
was another reason, which the following Part takes up.
III
THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATON OF THE SPEECH-BASED

DIGNITARY TORTS

A very different reason for the stunted development of unification lies outside the law of torts. This was the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States, beginning in 1964,
that it was necessary to recognize a new dimension of defamation, and eventually privacy and lIED, cases. 2 3 1 When those
230
See, e.g., LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 162-89 (2007);
John W. Wade, Tort Liabilityfor Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV.
63, 76-79 (1950).
231
See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (barring
plaintiffs' recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the absence of
actual malice); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (denying
liability in privacy tort where information on private individual was already a
matter of public record); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-91 (1964)
(requiring actual knowledge of falsehood or reckless disregard as to veracity to
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actions were based on conduct by defendants that constituted
forms of speech, defendants had a First Amendment privilege
that could serve as a bar to some of them. 2 3 2 This process of

constitutionalizing speech-based dignitary torts did more than
just restrict the scope of liability for many dignitary invasions.
In some ways, the process, along with the developments in the
world at large that accompanied it, also worked a transformation of the nature of dignity itself.
A.

Prelude: The Role of Speech-Related Values in Tort
Actions Prior to Constitutionalization

Both Prosser and Wade recognized that a number of invasions of privacy were produced by speech, activities of the
press, or other expressive activities. 2 33 This suggested that
determining whether particular conduct by a defendant was
actionable as a privacy tort sometimes required a balancing of
the interests protected by that tort against an interest in "newsworthiness," the "public's right to know," or "matters of public
concern." In his article Privacy, Prosser noted that the common law of defamation had developed privileges, such as fair
comment on matters of public concern and the fair and accurate reporting of official proceedings, which were designed to
prevent actions in slander and libel from unduly restricting the
freedoms of speech and the press, and wondered whether there
was any tendency to impose comparable restrictions in privacy
234
cases.
Wade had suggested that in privacy cases, "the courts
should be . . . doubly careful[ I to preserve the interests in
freedom of speech and of the press, which are to some extent
safeguarded by some of the rigid rules of the law of defamation." 2 3 5 Wade believed that there was "much more consideration given to the public interests of freedom of speech in the
recent right-of-privacy than in most of the defamation
cases[,]" 2 3 6 citing several cases decided since 1937 discussing
"the conflicting interests" of privacy and free speech. 2 3 7 He
thought, however, that the "reasonable man" standard of liabilimpose liability on newspaper for publishing defamatory falsehoods about public
official).
232
See, e.g., Falwel, 485 U.S. at 56.
233
See Prosser, supra note 164, at 384-86, 400-01; see Wade, supra note
106, at 1113-17.
234
See Prosser, supranote 164, at 401, 422-24.
235
Wade, supra note 106, at 1122.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 1122 n. 162.
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ity that had emerged in privacy cases provided a vehicle for
balancing, among other things, the "measure of offensive character of the statement, its truth or falsity, and the nature and
extent of [its] dissemination" against "the extent to which the
statement promotes the dissemination of newsworthy, cultural, or educational information, ideas, or opinions." 2 3 8
Prosser's and Wade's discussions of a public "interest" in
having access to "newsworthy" information or ideas, which was
balanced, in privacy cases, against the "right" of individuals to
not have that information disclosed or portrayed in a "false
light," were predicated on an assumption. This assumption
was that no constitutionalquestions were raised by the fact that
actions giving rise to privacy suits might involve speech, the
press, or the public's interest in learning about information or
ideas. That assumption was in keeping with the standard
treatment of freedom of speech and press issues in tort cases
prior to the mid- 1960s. Tort cases were regarded as "private"
for the purposes of the "state action" requirement for raising
or Fourteenth
constitutional issues; consequently, the First
239
Amendments did not apply to tort actions.
This did not mean, as we have seen, that non-constitutional values associated with freedom of expression, or the
public's access to information or ideas, played no role in tort
cases involving speech. Rather, those interests simply figured
in the common law balancing process in which courts determined whether the conduct, including the verbal conduct, of a
defendant was "offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities." 2 4 0 That is, by taking expression-related interests into

account, the elements of several causes of action, including
defamation, public disclosure privacy, and lIED, already
helped define each tort's own limitations on the scope of liability. But those were common law limitations, subject to variation among the states and to common law doctrinal evolution.
B.

The Constitutional Tidal Wave

In 1964, this all began to change. In that year, the Supreme Court decided a case that dramatically altered the constitutional dimensions of defamation cases, setting off a
decades-long chain of decisions in which the Court identified
First Amendment privileges in defamation, false light privacy,
238 Id at 1123 n.162a.
239 See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1650, 1658 (2009).
240 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975).

364

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:317

disclosure privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional dis24

1

tress cases.
The seminal case was New York Times v. Sullivan,2 4 2 which

revealed the Court's decision that, after nearly two centuries,
the common law of defamation would be affected by First
Amendment considerations. 2 4 3 The decision abandoned the
longstanding treatment of defamation cases as not raising constitutional issues because they involved "purely private" actions. 2 4 4 Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court peremptorily
disposed of that characterization in New York Times:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the
Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and the press. It matters not that
that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is
common law only ... The test is not the form in which state
power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether
245
such power has in fact been exercised.
Because the case involved a suit in Alabama against civil
rights advocates, it was directly connected to the Court's perception that some of the traditional rules of defamation law
could be manipulated by state courts to punish persons whose
expressive activities were highly unpopular in their states.
New York Times heightened the standard of liability in defamation suits by public officials, requiring them to prove "actual
malice" by the defendant: knowledge that the allegedly defamatory statement was false, or reckless disregard of whether the
statement was true or false. 2 4 6 In addition, New York Times
imposed more demanding requirements of proof, applicable to
both the standard of liability and damages in cases involving
public officials, all in order to protect freedom of speech and

241
See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (providing an example of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Cox Broad. Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (providing an example of disclosure privacy); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-91 (1964) (providing an example of
defamation).
242
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
243
See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) ("In 1964, we
decided in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, that the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution placed limits on the application of the state law of defamation." (citations omitted)).
244
See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 301-02 (Black, J., concurring).
245
Id. at 265.
246
See id. at 279-80.
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thereby to make it much more difficult for public officials to
2 47
recover in defamation actions.
The decision undermined the established theory that constitutional considerations were not present in defamation cases
because they were private civil actions. Previously, the only
function, in those and other tort cases, of the freedom of speech
and press protections in the First and Fourteenth Amendments
was to reflect other common law interests that could be balanced against those of privacy or reputation. 2 4 8 But such balancing was not constitutionally required. 2 4 9 The states, in
fashioning tort liabilities, had been free to choose whether, and
2 50
to what extent, to take those interests into account.
Now, however, constitutional law had not only invaded defamation cases with speech or press dimensions, it threatened
to significantly break the momentum of expanding actions in
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, at least
where the sources of harm in those cases came from expressive
activities.
This prospect was realized in a series of decisions following
New York Times. First, the Court expanded the category of
defamation plaintiffs for whom recovery necessitated a showing1
25
of actual malice, proved by clear and convincing evidence.
That category came to include "public figures," persons whose
general visibility or close connections to a noteworthy public
event or controversy made comments about them subjects of
widespread public interest or concern. 25 2 It also applied the
See id. at 283.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (noting
that "libelous" and "insulting" language had "never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem" since "such utterances are... of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality").
249
See id.
See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-58, 267 (1952) (holding that
250
the Court "cannot deny to a State power to punish [libelous utterances] directed at
a defined group, unless we can say that this is a wil[Ilful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State" and declining to strike
down criminal libel conviction).
See Rosenblatt v. Barr, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (noting that "[n]o precise
251
lines need to be drawn" to outline the category of public official who may be a
defamation plaintiff).
See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154, 164 (1967). It also came,
252
temporarily, to include private citizens defamed on matters of public concern. See
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971). The Court subsequently
reversed itself on the applicability of the New York Times requirements to private
citizens defamed on matters of public concern, holding, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974), that defamatory statements directed at that class
of persons needed only to be negligently made to permit recovery.
247
248
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actual malice and clear and convincing evidence standards to
"false light" privacy cases in Time, Inc. v. Hil,

253

involving an

article in Life Magazine about a play based on the ordeal of a
54
family taken hostage by escaped convicts.2
255
And in the 1975 case of Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a Georgia statute
making it a misdemeanor to broadcast the name of a rape
victim. 2 5 6

The Court held that when true information was

available in public records, the press had an absolute privilege
to publish it, whether or not disclosing that information might
have invaded the privacy of someone in other circumstances. 2 5 7 It was clear after Cox Broadcastingthat a very large
number of disclosure actions would run up against the "true
2 58
information in public records" privilege.
Some years later, the Court continued its application of
constitutional privileges to curtail the impact of common law
actions designed to secure redress for emotional harm. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwe, 2 59 a 1988 decision, Jerry Falwell, a
well-known evangelist minister and self-described leader of
"the moral majority," sued Hustler Magazine for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from an advertisement in
the magazine that satirized Falwell and his mother. 2 60 The
Court held that the Constitution precluded recovery by a public
official or public figure for lIED without proof that a statement
about the plaintiff was false and made with "actual malice" as
defined by New York Times. 2 6 1 After Falwell, it was not clear
whether the "outrageousness" standard for lIED, being "inherently subjective," was surmountable to allow a successful action for intentional infliction of emotional distress when that
2 62
action was based on speech or a publication in the media.
Finally, in Snyder v. Phelps, the Court held that the picketing of
a funeral by the defendant church members was "speech on a
253
254
255
256
257

385
See
420
See
See

U.S. 374 (1967).
AI. at 376-77.
U.S. 469 (1975).
i. at 471-72.
id. at 491.

258
See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (discussing the
publication of a rape victim's name); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97,

98 (1979) (discussing the newspaper publication of an alleged juvenile offender's

name); Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. Oklahoma Cty. Dist. Ct., 430 U.S. 308, 308 (1977)
(discussing the publication of the name of a minor connected to a Juvenile
proceeding).
259
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
260
See i. at 47-48.
261
See id. at 49-50, 56.
262
See id at 55.
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matter of public concern," in a "public forum" (a site near a
public street for which they had secured a permit), and was
thus protected by the First Amendment in an action for lIED by
263
members of the deceased's family.
C.

The Diminished Dignitary Torts

It is clear that the Court's line of decisions from New York
Times through Hill, Cox Broadcasting,Falwell, and Phelps has
resulted in First Amendment privileges cutting deeply into actions for defamation, false light and disclosure privacy, and
lIED. The Court's intervention began right at the time when
each of those torts was thought to be in an expansive phase
and commentators had begun to consider the doctrinal connections between them and the possibility that they might
merge into a generic action imposing liability for dignitary inva264
sions or mental suffering.
Not only had the expansion of the dignitary torts been significantly checked by the constitutionalization of defamation,
disclosure, false light privacy, and lIED, but in addition, in the
years in which constitutional privileges seemed to be overwhelming those actions, no commentator, even those employing the term dignity, followed Prosser and his contemporaries
by attempting a systematic analysis of the concept of dignity. A
reconstruction of privacy torts, along with the torts of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, to show
how at bottom those actions could be understood as protecting
dignity interests might have alleviated some of the dampening
effects of the Supreme Court decisions on the prospective
emergence of a generic tort action protecting dignity or mental
suffering. Such a reconstruction might have been able to supply a powerful, and increasingly resonant, rationale for using
tort law to provide redress for persons who found themselves
offended, embarrassed, or humiliated by the purposive conduct of others. But no such reconstruction of the torts as
"dignitary" actions took place. The expansive phase of a set of
torts that might have been understood as protecting various
aspects of individual dignity ended.
263 562 U.S. 443, 455 (2011).
264 See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 88, at 1053-54 (discussing the connections
between privacy-related torts); Bloustein, supra note 83, at 1000-01 (discussing a
generic action for privacy related torts and the "common thread" connecting these
torts); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?,
31 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 326, 327-28 (1966) (discussing the growth of the tort
for invasion of the right to privacy); Wade, supra note 106, at 1126-27 (discussing
a generic action for dignitary invasions).
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Indeed, virtually all the scholars we have mentioned either
shifted their focus or dropped the issue entirely. New York
Times and Hill were each decided between the appearance of
the third and fourth editions of Prosser's treatise on torts.
Prosser took advantage of those cases, which suggested that
the Supreme Court shared his apprehensiveness about the impact of defamation and privacy law on the freedom of speech
and the press, to add a chapter in his fourth edition, following
265
the chapter on privacy, entitled "Constitutional Privilege."
In that chapter he discussed New York Times at length 2 6 6 and
Hill in a more attenuated fashion. 2 6 7 He suggested that the
latter decision might portend an application of constitutional
privileges to other areas of privacy as law as well (Cox Broadcasting having not yet been decided). 2 68 In discussing the free
speech dimensions of common law privacy cases, Prosser noted
that a common law privilege for disclosing information, or
treating someone in a false light, had found its way into some
common law cases under the rubrics of "newsworthiness" or
the characterization of a plaintiff as a public figure, but that
those privileges had now been "taken over under the [Constitution]" 2 6 9 and one could expect that they might place more severe limitations on defamation and the expanding privacy torts
70
than common law privileges. 2
See PROSSER, supra note 88, at 810-33.
See id. at 823-27.
See id. at 827.
See id. at 825-29.
Id. at 827.
See id. at 827-29. Prosser's position was not surprising. He had been
having doubts even before the Supreme Court's entry into the field. By the publication of the fourth edition of Prosser's handbook, he occupied a somewhat ironic
position in the twentieth-century emergence of a series of torts designed to redress various forms of emotional harm. Along with Calvert Magruder, Fowler
Harper, and Mary Coate McNeely, Prosser had been one of the pioneers in identifying actions for lIED and privacy, and in suggesting, along with John Wade, that
the former of those actions might "absorb" the latter, as well as defamation, in a
generic tort for relief from intentionally caused mental suffering. But between
1941 and 1955, the years in which the first and second editions of his Torts
handbook were published, Prosser's assiduous cataloguing of cases in which
courts had entertained one or another actions for "privacy" had resulted in his
recognizing that the legal concept of privacy had different dimensions, not all of
which harmonized with one another. The courts had been using "privacy" to
describe actions in which the plaintiffs interest was not always synonymous with
a "right to be left alone," as Warren and Brandeis had suggested, but with reputation or the right to control the use of one's name or likeness. Only in intrusion
cases, Prosser suggested, were plaintiffs truly asking to be let alone.
By the time Prosser published his article on privacy in 1960, his thinking had
evolved a step further. He now thought that the quite different interests being
protected in privacy cases, and the different elements of the various privacy torts,
had created confusion in the courts, and the situation was accentuated by the
265
266
267
268
269
270
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After the Court decided New York Times, the reaction of
other commentators for the next two decades was generally to
predict the severe contraction, if not the demise, of tort actions
designed to redress emotional harm, at least where it had been
caused by speech or other expressive activities. The first prominent torts scholar to recognize the implications of the Court's
discovery of constitutional privileges in tort cases was Harry
Kalven, who, we have seen, had been attracted in the 1950s to
the idea that several tort actions protected an interest in
27 1
dignity.
In 1966, Kalven wrote an article in which he argued that
the growth of the action for disclosure privacy had been a mistake because it was unclear what the elements of the action
were. 2 7 2 In addition, in his view, the action invited trivial suits

and would likely not be used by persons who were genuinely
affected by the disclosure of facts about themselves or their
2 73
families, since doing so would tend to increase their distress.
Kalven also noted the appearance of New York Times and suggested that after that decision, constitutional privileges might
be "so overpowering as virtually to swallow the tort" of
2 74
privacy.
Kalven went on to suggest that there were problems with
each of the privacy torts Prosser had identified. 2 75 Kalven's
comments regarding Prosser's role in contributing to what he
took to be the state of the privacy tort were noteworthy. On the
one hand, Prosser's survey of privacy cases as composing a
"complex" of four different actions had created the impression
that the tort was multiplying and growing: Kalven noted that a
number of courts had used the formulation Prosser had
presented in his Privacy article, and nearly every one of the
American states had created a common law action for privacy. 2 7 6 If one traced the origins of the privacy tort to Warren's
expanded use of the "privacy" rubric. He expressed apprehension at those developments, wondering about the effects on freedom of speech and the press of
liability standards such as "offensive to community mores," and suggesting that
some comparatively trivial harms, such as "laudatory falsehoods," might be made
actionable. His skepticism about the future of privacy, and his classification of
the tort itself, provoked Bloustein to redescribe the privacy torts as invasions of
human dignity, and then to revive Prosser's initial notion of a generic tort redressing mental suffering.
See GREGORY & KALVEN, JR., supra note 160, at 883-99.
271
272
See Kalven, supra note 264, at 326-27, 330-31.
273
See id. at 338-39.
274
Id. at 336.
See id. at 331-33.
275
See id. at 327.
276
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and Brandeis's article, which Kalven suggested had associated
violations of privacy only with unauthorized disclosure of personal information, Prosser's synthesis, bringing other actions
within the "privacy" umbrella, amounted to, "[o]n a very small
scale . . . a Copernican revolution." 2 7 7 On the other hand,
Prosser's definition of "privacy" had arguably undermined "the
whole spirit, dignity, and deep rationale for the tort," substituting for "the grand underlying principle of inviolate personality
and individual dignity... four ad hoc categories" that bore little
analytical commonality with one another. 2 78 The "deadening
common sense" of Prosser's approach, Kalven felt, had "cut[]
the tort loose from the philosophic moorings Warren and Bran27 9
deis gave it."
All in all, Kalven's analysis of the state of privacy law at the
moment when constitutional privileges were about to affect it
was far from upbeat. Not only did he conclude that disclosure
privacy was fraught with analytical difficulties and had the
potential to spawn trivial lawsuits. He also predicted that the
growing attention of courts to "newsworthiness" privileges was
likely to be accentuated by the Supreme Court's conclusion
that constitutional privileges affected the tort was as well,

threatening to obliterate

it.

2

80

Those future problems for the

disclosure tort, Kalven felt, might result in its original core
28 1
virtually disappearing.
This was a sobering assessment, coming only two years
after Bloustein's effort to repackage "privacy" actions as efforts
to redress one or another assault on human dignity, and only
four years after Wade's projection that the expansion of privacy
actions might absorb defamation actions, reducing the technical barriers to recovery existing in the common law of defamation and themselves be absorbed in a vast generic tort action of
intentional infliction of mental suffering. 28 2 Prosser, who had
himself been strongly identified with that suggestion in 1941,
by 1966, appeared as the cold-eyed analyst who had reduced
privacy law to ad hoc categories, stripping it of its origins in the
recognition of human personality and dignity.
Although Bloustein wrote a rejoinder to Kalven 283 and continued to identify emotional harm torts with the protection of
277

I& at 332.

278

Id. at 332-33.

279
280
281

Id. at 333.
See id. at 333-38.
See id. at 336.

282

See Bloustein, supra note 83, at 974; Wade, supra note 106, at 1124-25.
Bloustein, supra note 205, at 611.

283
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interests sounding in dignity, he was bucking the scholarly tide
over the next two decades. As early as 1964, Mark Franklin
had concluded that the "newsworthiness" privilege in privacy
cases had roots in the First Amendment. 2 8 4 And after Hill, Cox
Broadcasting,and a subsequent case, FloridaStar v. B.J.F, in
which the Court concluded that the publication of true information lawfully obtained on a matter of public interest could
not be restricted absent a showing of a state interest of the
highest order, 28 5 many commentators, writing between the
mid-1960s and the 1990s, pronounced the virtual end of dis28 6
closure privacy.
Academic interests are the product of a variety of influences. But we believe that the entry of the Supreme Court into
the field of dignitary torts not only affected these torts directly,
but also influenced the decline in scholarly writing about them.
Prosser died in 1972;287 Wade shifted his interest to products
liability and comparative fault. 2 8 8 Casebooks began to feature

the Supreme Court opinions, necessarily giving shorter shrift
289
to the substantive nuances of the liability that remained.
284 See Franklin, supra note 100, at 822.
285 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
286 For an overview, see Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A
Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 294
(1983), who argues that the tort of privacy as constructed by Warren and Brandeis has serious constitutional issues.
287 Abraham & White, supra note 107, at 40.
288 Wade's work after the 1970s was influential in both fields. His "risk-utility
test" for a defective product in products liability was eventually adopted in the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. a (Am. LAw INST. 1977) after Wade had first
articulated it in On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products,44 MISS. L.J. 825
(1973). Between that year and his death, he wrote several additional articles on
products liability. In addition, he was the author of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 12 U.L.A. 43 (West Supp. 1995), and between 1974 and 1984 published
several articles on comparative fault and its effect on multiple parties. For more
detail on Wade's torts scholarship, see Gary Myers, Dean John Wade and the Law
of Torts, 65 MISS. L.J. 29 (1995).
289 We surveyed successive editions of three prominent Torts casebooks from
the 1970s to the present. The casebooks were MARK FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN,
TORT LAw AND ALTERNATIVES (1st ed. 1971-10th ed. 2016); CHARLES 0. GREGORY,
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & RICHARD E. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (3d ed.
1977-1 lth ed. 2016), and WILLIAM L. PROSSER & JOHN WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS (5th ed. 1971-13th ed. 2015). The casebook editors changed to some
extent during that time interval, but at least one editor remained constant on all
the successive editions. The survey revealed, first, a dramatic increase in the use
of Supreme Court opinions constitutionalizing defamation and privacy as principal cases in the coverage of those areas between 1971 and 1979, an interval in
which Gertz and Cox Broadcastingwere decided; second, the consistent employment of such opinions as principal cases in the coverage of defamation and
privacy between 1979 and 2005, the casebooks devoting, in that time interval,
between 22% and 60% of their coverage of defamation and privacy to constitutional decisions by the Court affecting those areas; and third, a slight fall off both
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And younger scholars, partly following the lead of what the
casebooks emphasized, began to focus on the intersection of
tort and the First Amendment, de-emphasizing the common
290
law features of the torts.
D.

The Law's Influence on the Nature of Dignity Itself

Beginning in 1964, there was a final, less tangible and
therefore harder to isolate, consequence of the constitutionalization of the dignitary torts. The gravamen of Warren's and
Brandeis's "privacy" tort was the public disclosure of information that a person chose to keep private simply because its
being made public was considered embarrassing, humiliating,
or otherwise "unseemly." The emergence of First Amendment
privileges in actions whose gist was that they were invasions of
a plaintiffs "dignity" made it much more likely that those invasions would be constitutionally protected against tort liability.
This meant, for example, that unauthorized photographs of
individuals could appear in print, books with potentially embarrassing true facts about the lives of persons could be published with impunity, awkward dimensions of a subject's past
could be revealed, and true information available in public
records could not be made the basis of a disclosure action.
Moreover, offensive or false comments about public figures and
even private citizens were much less likely to be actionable in
in the number of Supreme Court decisions used as principal cases, and the
percentage of those cases compared to the total number of principal cases in the
coverage of defamation and privacy, in successive editions between 2005 and the
present. The fall off was so slight as to not be statistically significant but it may
reflect the fact that the Court has not decided a case raising the issue of constitutional privileges in defamation or privacy since Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001).
With respect to lIED, the only constitutional decision used as a principal case
was Hustler, which appeared in the fifth edition of GREGORY, KALVEN & EPSTEIN
(1990) and all editions of FRANKLIN & RABIN since the fifth edition in 1992. Snyder
v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), has yet to appear as a principal case, and no
constitutional decisions affecting lIED have been treated as principal cases in the
coverage of that tort in editions of PROSSER & WADE or in any editions of GREGORY,
KALVEN & EPSTEIN save the fifth edition. We are not inclined to attach any significance to that data because the number of principal cases employed in the coverage of lIED has been very small in all the editions we surveyed, ranging from one
to six cases and averaging around two cases.
For a spreadsheet covering successive editions of the casebooks surveyed, see
Kent C. Olson, Supreme Court Cases in Torts Casebooks (Nov. 14, 2017) (unpublished document) (on file with the authors).
See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEx. L. REV. 387, 401
290
(2008) (discussing privacy torts and intellectual property with an emphasis on the
First Amendment, rather than common law).
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defamation or IIED if they were associated with matters of pub29 1
lic concern.
In light of the constitutional privileges limiting the potential success of all these tort actions, the opportunities for protecting "dignity" interests-freedom from embarrassment,
humiliation, ridicule, inaccurate characterization, interference
with "peace of mind"-have been reduced. More people have
correspondingly been exposed to the risk of having their dignity
violated in more ways. 2 9 2 It is possible, therefore, that as the
dignity of Americans is increasingly violated because those potential defendants are constitutionally privileged, something
like a deadening of the interests in dignity itself has resulted. 2 9 3 Thus, constitutional privileges are not merely "balanced" against the interests ostensibly protected by dignitary
torts, they serve to reduce the cultural and personal significance of those interests. If previously "unseemly" public portrayals of individuals are increasingly the norm, it becomes
harder to ascertain what conduct a society treats as unseemly.
Dignitary torts may be harder to conceptualize now simply because constitutionalization has reduced the space for, and
therefore the very meaning of, dignity.
Cultural and technological developments, usually more
powerful than law alone, have of course both reflected and
reinforced this phenomenon. Once presidential candidates
have willingly answered questions about their underwear, 2 9 4
and images of individuals in a variety of awkward, humorous,
291 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 108, at 199, 202 n. 1, 218; see, e.g.,
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458-59 (2011) (holding that the First Amendment
protected an offensive protest of a private individual's funeral because the deceased's military background introduced an element of public concern); Haynes v.
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229-30 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the First
Amendment protects a person who publishes unflattering facts about the lives of
others); Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 40 Cal. 2d. 224, 228-30 (Cal. 1953) (holding that
the First Amendment would protect the publication of an unauthorized photograph of individuals on public ground provided that the picture was unaccompanied by text).
292
See Tilley, supra note 5, at 65.
293
For some evidence consistent with that suggestion, see Irina Raicu, Are
Attitudes About Privacy Changing?, MARKKULA CTR. FOR APPLIED ETHIcS (June 1,
2012), https: //www.scu.edu/ethics/privacy/are-attitudes-about-privacy-chang
ing/ [https://perma.cc/5BEW-ZY7P]; Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Future
of Privacy, PEw RES. CTR. (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.pewintemet.org/2014/12/
18/future-of-privacy/ [https: //perma.cc/8FE8-3AR3].
294
While a candidate for president, Bill Clinton answered the question, "boxers or briefs?" by saying, "usually briefs." Richard Lei, The Commander in Briefs,
WASH.PosT (Apr. 29, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/
1994/04/20/the-commander-in-briefs/04219ef3-aa61-4f28-8869-6217476c lb
47/?utm_term=. 1307ce 1f0ba4 [https://perma.cc/ZM73-EMCB].
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or salacious poses are commonly posted on social media, 29 5
what counts as an "undignified" or "extreme and outrageous"
portrayal becomes increasingly difficult to determine. The importance of dignity itself comes into question and the practical
strength of the torts that protect dignitary invasions possibly
wanes as a result.
IV
THE INEVITABLE STRUCTURE OF THE DIGNITARY TORTS

For the reasons we have discussed, then, whatever momentum might have been building in the 1940s and 1950s
toward a generic tort action for redress from mental suffering,
possibly grounded on the growing resonance of the concept of
human dignity, had ceased by the mid-1960s. Two decades
later, the Supreme Court's recognition of the impact of constitutional privileges on defamation, privacy, and lIED have effectuated severe limits on any future expansion of those torts, and
it is possible that those privileges have had a deadening effect
on the concept of dignity itself.
The diversity of interests that the different dignitary torts
protect, and the imposition of constitutional limits on the permissible scope of liability for these torts, probably would have
been sufficient, on their own, to preclude the development of a
unified theory of liability for interference with dignity, and certainly sufficient to preclude a general cause of action of this
sort. There is another, arguably even more fundamental reason, however, that such a theory and cause of action never did,
and never could, develop: the fundamental character of the
common law of torts.
A.

The Once and Future Forms of Action

From early on, tort liability was grounded in a series of
different forms of action, each of which had its particular, and
often technical, requirements. 2 9 6 These were, roughly speaking, different causes of action in tort. Perhaps the most wellknown example to modem readers is trespass vi et armis,
which was a form of action available only when a defendant
See Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, Above-and-Beyond Responses: Part 2,
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PEW REs. CTR. (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.pewintemet.org/2014/12/18/aboveand-beyond-responses-part-2-2/ [https://perma.cc/QF86-28L7] (explaining that
"[b]y 2025, you will be considered a non-person if you do not have embarrassing
photos or videos online").
See Baker, supra note 84, at 401-03; MAITLAND, supranote 7, at 2-5.
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had injured the plaintiff directly and by force or violence. 2 9 7
This form of action is the precursor of the modem tort of battery. 2 98 But each form of action had its own limits, as Maitland
observed,
[T]o a very considerable degree the substantive law administered in a given form of action has grown up independently of
the law administered in other forms. Each procedural pigeonhole contains its own rules of substantive law, and it is with
great caution that we may argue from what is found in one to
what will probably be found in another; each has its own
precedents ... [the plaintiff] may find that plausible as his
case may seem, it just will not fit any one of the receptacles
provided by the courts and he may take to himself the lesson
299
that where there is no remedy there is no wrong.
The distinctions between different forms of action lay,
among other things, in what we would now call the applicable
standard of care, the kind of conduct in which the defendant
had engaged, and the nature of the injury resulting from the
defendant's conduct. When the writ system on which the forms
of action were based was abolished in the middle of the nineteenth century, the procedural and pleading systems that supported them disappeared. 30 0 But the substantive distinctions
that characterized the different forms of action did not disappear. 30 1 What remained were a series of different causes of
action in tort, each with their own separate substantive elements. 30 2 The standard of care applicable in battery (an intent
to make contact with the plaintiffs body), for example, was
different from the standard of care applicable in defamation
(intentional or negligent publication of material that defames
303
the plaintiff).
These substantive differences, with their roots in the forms
of action at common law, have come down to us today as they
are reflected in the differences between different torts, including the dignitary torts. These torts have different elements. It
would be impossible to unify them completely in a cause of
action for infringement of dignity without adopting more nearly
297

See BAKER, supra note 84, at 402-05.
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See id,
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supra note 7, at 4-5.
See id. at 5-7.
See ABRAHAM, supranote 74, at 299, 308-10 (discussing some of the differMAITLAND,

ent causes of action for privacy-related torts).
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See id.
303 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (discussing
the standard of care applicable to battery); see also PROSSER, supranote 88, at 810
(discussing the standard of care applicable to defamation).
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uniform elements. Doing so, however, would eliminate differences that are not only the remnants of the old forms of action,
but also demarcate important normative distinctions.
In contrast to the top-down structure of the civil law, the
bottom-up structure of the common law means that both the
courts and scholars are virtually compelled to think in terms of
causes of action. And because of the bottom-up, case-by-case
approach of the common law, new causes of action also are
often under-theorized. The principles that lie behind them
must be inferred from individual decisions. Undertaking this
task, the U.S. tort scholars we discussed had once started to
recognize that many of the cases were based on the protection
of "peace of mind" or "dignity." But this process of recognition
never led, and never could have led, as it did in Europe, to the
discovery of broad protection for a right of "personality" or "dig30 4
nity" in torts cases.
Rather, previously unrecognized liabilities, for such
wrongs as invasion of privacy or IIED, were understood as new,
particularized causes of action.3 0 5 Like existing torts, structurally these new torts are composed of their own separate and
distinctive elements, some of which may, but are not necessarily required, to overlap with the elements of already existing
causes of action. For example, battery is actionable when a
touching is "offensive" and without regard to the reaction of the
plaintiff (though the plaintiffs reaction may affect the amount
of damages suffered). 30 6 In contrast, IIED is actionable only
and
when the defendant's conduct is "extreme and outrageous"
30 7
distress."
emotional
"severe
the plaintiff suffers
These differences reflect the complicated relationship between the comparative importance of bodily and emotional security, on the one hand, and the ways in which ordinary
interactions between individuals occur. People expect to be
touched, if at all, only in non-offensive, expressly or impliedly
consented-to ways. But it is to be expected that people may
inflict emotional distress on others. Sometimes people are sarcastic, ridicule others, or build up their own self-esteem at
others' expense. This kind of conduct may not be admired, and
it may be criticized, but it is not regarded as beyond the bounds
See discussion supra subpart II.B.
See Merritt, supranote 4, at 27 (discussing the "new" tort of fIED): see also
Wade, supranote 106, at 1093-95 (discussing the development of the invasion of
privacy tort).
See discussion supra section II.A. 1.
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See discussion supra section II.A.4.
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of what is socially acceptable. It does not deeply call into question the worth-the dignity-of the individual in question, and
therefore is not actionable as lIED.
Analogous normative differences are reflected in the elements of the other dignitary torts. When a defamatory statement does not concern a matter of public interest, it is
effectively actionable on a strict liability basis. 30 8 On the other
hand, there certainly is no strict liability for invasion of private
solitude and probably no liability for negligent invasion of private solitude. The defendant must intend the invasion. 30 9
These differences, debatable though their wisdom may be in
marginal cases, reflect normative differences between the two
kinds of conduct. Making defamatory statements about others
without the kind of justification supplied by a privilege is regarded as inappropriate, whereas accidental invasion of someone's privacy may produce embarrassment, but it is excusable.
B.

Consequences and Implications

It is no surprise that Prosser's conclusion that his early
efforts to conceptualize a cause of action that unified invasion
of privacy and infliction of emotional distress had been unsuccessful. He saw that the developing case law did not support
him.3 1 0 Plaintiffs did not bring suit for invasion of privacy but
instead for intrusion, disclosure, false light, or commercial appropriation. There was not even a unified cause of action for
invasion of privacy, let alone one for interference with
3 11
dignity.
If there had instead been a unified cause of action for redress of an interference with one of these very different forms of
dignitary invasion, one of two things would have happened.
Either liability would have been imposed in some situations in
which it would have been normatively unattractive or the supposedly-eliminated distinctions between the elements of the
different dignitary causes of actions would have been smuggled
back into the calculus, probably by way of application of the
concept of a dignitary invasion to different fact situations. Little would have been accomplished substantively; old wine
would simply have been poured into new bottles.
308

See ABRAHAM, supranote 74, at 300.
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See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).

310 See Prosser, supra note 164, at 389-98, 422.
311 See id. at 389; see also GREGORY & KALVEN, JR., supra note 160, at 883-84
(mentioning Prosser's assertion that most privacy torts would be absorbed into
the IIED tort); Bloustein, supra note 83, at 971-72 (discussing Prosser's opinion
that there Is no single privacy tort).
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To take that approach, and create a unified cause of action
for interference with dignity, would be to reject the common law
approach and instead to adopt the top-down approach of the
codified civil law systems. Just as the various European laws
of torts protect the right of "personality" in the way we described earlier, the American law of torts would have protected
a right to dignity, but left the content of the right to be filled in
over time, through the development of different rules governing
the protection of different interests.
This is fundamentally because the character of the law
governing the dignitary torts is not simply the path-dependent
legacy of the particularforms of action that evolved into the
modern dignitary torts, but a reflection of the deep structure of
the common law of torts itself. Given that, under this structure, each tort is composed of its own separate elements, it is
hard to imagine the state of affairs we have just described being
otherwise. After all, the causes of action for lIED and invasion
of privacy did not exist at all even late in the age of the forms of
action. 3 1 2 Nonetheless, their development followed the approach of the old forms of action, with different elements being
slowly identified until each separate cause of action could was
discermable from the case law. 3 13 lIED and invasion of privacy

3 14
were simply new forms of action.
In addition, one of the consequences of the common law
process of developing all these causes of action has been to
erect boundaries between them that have prevented cross-pollination across torts that protect the same kind of interest. Not
only have these boundaries necessarily prevented unification,
they have unnecessarily prevented inter-doctrinal enrichment.
The forms of action may have long ago disappeared, but their
legacy continues to influence the nature of common law reasoning in tort law. For example, the courts simply have no
occasion to observe or rely on the fact that offensive battery
and intrusion on solitude each protect a liberty/autonomy interest, or that public disclosure and lIED often protect the
same or a very similar interest in avoiding embarrassment or
humiliation. The principles that develop in each tort to protect
these interests therefore remain separate. There is no synergy

See PROSSER, supra note 88, at 45; see also WHITE, supranote 103, at 104;
312
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 108, at 195-98.
313
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at
308-10; Merritt, supra note 4, at 15-16, 21.
See PROSSER, supranote 88, at 45; see also Prosser, supranote 164, at 389;
314
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 108, at 195-98; WHITE, supranote 103, at 104.
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among these separate torts, and no mutual influence. There
certainly is no recognition that different torts protect a like
interest, aside from the occasional use of the label "dignitary"
to describe them.
The imposition of constitutional limits on the permissible
scope of some but not all the dignitary torts that we discussed
earlier has been yet another obstacle to even partial conceptual
unification or cross-pollination of them. The scope of offensive
battery, false imprisonment, and intrusion on solitude are unaffected by any such constitutional considerations because
they are not accomplished through speech or expression. Each
of the other torts, however, is subject to at least some constitutional constraint. "Actual malice" in the constitutional sense
has come to be a required element in public disclosure, false
light, and lIED when public issues are involved, and the First
Amendment concern for protecting artistic creativity con3 15
strains at least some liability for commercial appropriation.
The resulting gulf between the elements of the torts that involve
speech and those that do not has rendered unification or crosspollination even more difficult and unlikely. The already inevitable divisions between the torts were reinforced by a constitutionally mandated set of separations.
CONCLUSION

We have sought to achieve three goals in this article. One
was to gain a deeper and more nuanced understanding of dignity as a cultural and legal concept by exploring its evolution in
western thought and unraveling the different social and legal
interests that it might be thought to protect. A second has
been to identify why, since the conclusion of the Second World
War, there has been a recurrent interest, in both Europe and
America, in attempting to use law, particularly tort law, as a
means of vindicating and protecting dignitary interests. The
third has been to explain why, in the United States, that interest has not only failed to produce any expansion of the protection of various forms of "dignity" in the law of torts, but failed to
result in any systematic analysis of what the legal concept of
dignity actually consists of.
We began our inquiry with a puzzle-why, in the face of the
growing resonance afforded human dignity and its protection
in the international community, has the concept not increased
its legal bite or even been unpacked in a satisfactory manner315

See, e.g., Winter v. D.C. Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003).
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and end it with the conclusion that there are formidable difficulties to accomplishing the first of those possibilities. The
difficulties, however, are instructive. Confronting them results
in the recognition that dignity, as a legal concept, is extremely
complicated, and it is a concept unlikely to become integrated
into any area of American law, such as tort law, that has a
common law heritage.

